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Reviewing American Foreign Policy Since 1945

*Statement by Senator Tom Connally
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations¹*

CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

MR. PRESIDENT, before the Senate begins its recess I should like to take a few minutes to review the foreign policy of the United States. I feel compelled to do so because of the confusion that has arisen due to a number of developments in this field since the beginning of the Eighty-first Congress. Notable among these are the host of unjustified criticisms of our Far-Eastern policy and various unwise efforts at injecting partisan politics into the conduct of our foreign relations.

Mr. President, it is always tempting in such a situation to strike back at the critics and to demonstrate—as would be so easy in this case—how unwise they are, particularly those who would serve their own selfish ends at the expense of their country. But I propose to resist that temptation and to address my remarks to the people of the United States who are anxious to know the facts about the foreign policy of our country at this critical juncture in our history.

At the outset, I am sure, I need scarcely remind anyone in this body, and, indeed, in the country as a whole, of the world significance of our actions abroad. Our foreign policy is of the deepest moment both to the citizens of the United States and to the people of the entire world. It is in this spirit that I wish to set the record straight.

Mr. President, ever since the last great conflict our policy has been based on the assumption that war with the Soviet Union can be avoided. War is not inevitable. We may be in for a long period of Communist subversion, intrigue, sabotage, and, in peripheral areas like Korea, even armed aggression. But if we pursue the course we are now embarked upon with determination and vigor, we may be able to convince the Kremlin that open hostilities with the West would be a tragic mistake.

¹ Presented to the Senate on Sept. 22 and reprinted from *Congressional Record* of the same date, p. 15,761.

So long as there is a good chance for us to avoid war in this manner those who argue that we should launch a preventive war against the Soviet Union are doing a real disservice to their country and to the cause of world peace. Such an argument not only plays squarely into the hands of Communist propagandists; it tends to bring on the very thing we are desperately trying to prevent.

If there is anything upon which the American people are agreed it is that the greatest threat to world convalescence and peace is the political and social cancer of international communism. We know that this organism of evil is attacking the international body at many vital points. It has fastened on weakened members and remains a constant threat even to the healthy tissue. Our action against Communist imperialism will continue in its course of restoring and rebuilding democratically minded nations so that they will have the strength and the will to resist aggression and defend their liberty. The keystone of this policy of containment has been described as the development of situations of strength. We know that Soviet policy and Soviet action are closely attuned to the facts of any given circumstance. Our plans call for taking a firm hand in connection with certain key situations so that the masters of the Communist campaign will abandon their drive for world dominion and adopt a more reasonable live-and-let-live approach.

The recent conversations which Secretary Acheson had with our North Atlantic neighbors deal with several such situations and the current meeting of the United Nations Assembly will take up others. Let me review briefly some of these problems.

Security in Western Europe

Immediately under discussion is the focal point of our whole policy—the security of western Europe. Despite the war in Korea and the ten-

sion throughout the Far East—let us never forget it—Europe is still the pivotal point. Continued weakness in western Europe will free the Soviet Union for aggressive action everywhere. A strong Europe is a barrier, not only to Soviet ambitions in the West but to the Kremlin's freedom of action in the Middle East and in the Far East as well. It is this fundamental fact which was behind the recent Presidential announcement of assigning additional units of ground troops to western Europe. I heartily agree with the President's insistence that this increase in American forces there must be accompanied by similar efforts on the part of the nations of western Europe. I admit that their contributions to the defense of the North Atlantic area has entailed some sacrifices. But it is imperative that far more be done. Every one of the signatories to the North Atlantic Pact must contribute its fair share if western Europe is to be made secure. France has indicated a willingness to raise 15 divisions. When, and only when, the men to fill the ranks are recruited, France will have demonstrated her determination to do her part. As for Britain, their budgetary provision for an increased land army is a beginning but only a beginning. I do not mention these two nations to single them out but merely to indicate that nothing less than a maximum effort will create the necessary force. There is no easy way to do this job. We are all going to have to take in our belts several notches before we can reach that stage of preparedness where we can feel safe from Communist aggression.

The North Atlantic Council has already agreed that the defense forces of western Europe will be organized on a balanced and collective pattern. This is a sound and common-sense decision. There is no practical alternative. Nevertheless, bitter experience has demonstrated that forces under national command—however well-balanced—lack the unity and the cohesion essential for maximum effectiveness in combat. We must now press on to the next step—the establishment of an integrated military force of a power sufficient to safeguard freedom in western Europe. This force should be under a supreme commander, assisted by a combined staff and with full authority to exercise command.

It is in the context of a European army that we ought to consider one particular important problem that has concerned us all—the role of Germany in the defense of western Europe.

THE ROLE OF GERMANY

I am convinced that it is time for us to put an end to a contradiction in fact which has existed since the formation of the North Atlantic Council. We talk in terms of the defense of western Europe. But even an armchair strategist can see that the defense of western Europe involves the defense of western Germany. Any other concept is unthinkable.

able. If we were to fix our defenses on the Rhine, we would automatically accord to the Soviet the manpower of western Germany, that vast reservoir of technical skills and the great industrial centers of the Ruhr and the Saar. In effect, we would be turning over to the Soviet on a silver platter precisely those elements which they need the most.

The recent decision to ask Congress to terminate the state of war with West Germany is an essential step in making Germany an integral part of the western European community. Likewise, the decision to permit an increase in the German police force will place western Germany in a far better position to deal with Communist disorders and sabotage. But we must go further than that. We must acknowledge the right and indeed the duty of the Germans to contribute not only to their own defense but to the defense of western Europe as well. It is time that provision is made for the inclusion of German units in the integrated European army toward which we are working.

Now I understand fully and sympathize thoroughly with the natural reaction of the French people to anything that looks like German rearmament. The sound of Nazi hobnails goosestepping down the boulevards of Paris is too fresh in their memory for them to have any other reaction. But they must be convinced that what is sought does not involve the creation of a German army. What is sought is the creation of a European army. What is sought is the use of German troop units in an integrated European force under a supreme allied commander. With this sort of arrangement French people will have an iron-clad guaranty that a German army, under a German general staff, will never again menace France's eastern borders.

The principle of European integration, which is basically sound, should also be extended to the production of military equipment. Western Europe is a great workshop second only to America. Collectively, it has an imposing industrial potential. This productive capacity should be organized so that each nation concentrates on the weapons and equipment which it is best equipped to produce.

With these points past the agreement stage and in the action phase, I think that we would be well along toward the creation of the situation of strength in western Europe which conditions there demand. With the Soviet force of over 100 divisions just behind the iron curtain, the existence of the present military vacuum in the West creates a situation so hazardous as to demand the most strenuous efforts of which we all are capable.

The Far East

In the Far East, it is my conviction that we should press forward without delay with the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan. As General MacArthur has so correctly pointed out, a

military occupation drops sharply in effectiveness after 5 years. Our forces are just completing their fifth year in the home islands. As time goes on, their continued presence will be less and less of an asset and more and more of a liability. A just treaty of peace, which takes into account the military requirements of the American position in the western Pacific and world peace, will free us of occupational burdens without weakening our defenses. Possibly some American military units should remain in Japan, not as an occupying force but to prevent the creation of a vacuum into which alien forces would almost certainly move.

FORMOSA AND COMMUNIST CHINA

With regard to the related problems presented by Formosa, Communist China, and Korea, we must continue a cool and level-headed approach which does not lose sight of both our immediate and long-range interests. Obviously, as long as the war in Korea continues, we must safeguard our flank by neutralizing the island of Formosa. That is the reason the President has ordered the Seventh Fleet to stand by in Formosan waters. However, we must avoid like the plague any unilateral action on our part to solve the problem of what to do with Formosa once the victory in Korea has been won. By any terms, this is a United Nations problem and the sooner it is brought to the consideration of that organization the better. It would perhaps be well to grasp this issue by the forelock by moving for the immediate appointment of a United Nations commission to study the matter. This move would reassure our many friends in the Far East and would establish beyond contradiction that we have no designs on the island. All interested parties could present their views before such a commission.

The great and overriding problem in dealing with Formosa, and with the Red regime in China, is that under no circumstances should we allow ourselves to be tricked into a shooting war on the Chinese mainland. While Formosa is important to our security, it is certainly not that important. If by some maneuver the Soviets could involve us in land warfare with Mao Tse-tung, there would be rejoicing in the Kremlin. The burden imposed on our resources and our manpower would bleed us white and the Soviets could then pursue their diabolical plan to subjugate mankind without fear of effective opposition.

Mr. President, many ball players and some politicians spend far too much time looking at the grandstand. Let us keep our eyes on the ball. The real danger to the United States and to world peace is not Red China but Red Russia.

While we are determined to avoid war with Red China, we must continue to refuse to support those moves which come under the heading of appeasement. We should continue to oppose the seating of Communist representatives in the United Nations. The replacement of the Nationalist delega-

tion to the United Nations by the Communists would be a farce as long as they flout the principles of the United Nations Charter and disregard the long-established rules of international law.

In connection with our desire to avoid war with the Chinese Communists, it is not unlikely that we will have the cooperation of the Chinese Red leaders themselves. Like their Kremlin prototypes, they are hard-boiled realists. We must give them credit for having common sense enough to realize that even a successful war against the United States would accomplish nothing so much as to fold them in the fatal embrace of the Russian bear.

Mr. President, Mao Tse-tung knows full well the danger that confronts his country. He must know all about Russian ambitions in the Far East. He must know the master planners in the Kremlin would like to dismember his country. He must know it would be folly for China to yield to Communist pressures and go to war against the free countries which have always been friends of the Chinese people.

In China, as in other regions, we must tailor our policies to fit our purposes. We have made it clear and we must continue to make it clear that we have absolutely no territorial or aggressive designs on China or on any other country. We must avoid impulsive and foolish acts, such as the unilateral occupation of Formosa, which would gravely antagonize the Chinese people and cast dark clouds of suspicion over us throughout all Asia.

It is true, Mr. President, that what happens in Asia is of vital interest to the United States and to all peace-loving nations. We must, however, embrace the fundamental proposition that the problems of that great area will have to be worked out by the people and the governments of Asia. We can do much to help, but we cannot take over.

Moreover, we must never lose sight of our major objective in China—to restore the ties of friendship which have traditionally existed between us and the Chinese people. As a more immediate purpose, we should do what we can to prevent the 450 million people of China from coming under the complete domination of Moscow. That has not happened yet, and it is vital that it should not happen.

KOREA

The spectacular progress of the United Nations army in Korea poses very sharply the question as to just what the United Nations should do when its victorious forces reach the 38th parallel. Let me emphasize that this is not a matter for the United States to decide. It is a decision which the United Nations itself must make.

The General Assembly has twice resolved, by votes unanimous but for the Soviet bloc, that Korea should be united and independent. The responsibility for blocking these efforts rests

squarely on the Soviet Union. In the face of this obstructionism, it might be helpful for the General Assembly once more to reassure the world that the creation of a united and free Korea remains the purpose of the United Nations. Such a policy could imply no threat to Korea's neighbors or to the peace of Asia. On the other hand, without it there can be no assurance that the Communist leadership of North Korea will not plot another aggression against the Republic of Korea.

While the United Nations has set up the goal of a united Korea, I do not think it is possible to determine now just what our troops will do when they reach the 38th parallel. I repeat, that is for the United Nations to decide. And that decision cannot be made intelligently until we know how and under what circumstances United Nations forces reach the dividing line between North and South Korea.

Strengthening the United Nations

While I am speaking about the United Nations I would like to call attention to the very able address given by Secretary Acheson at the opening session of the General Assembly on Wednesday in New York. Many of his suggestions are of a constructive nature and, if adopted, would make the United Nations a more effective instrument for world peace. In particular it would be very helpful if each member nation would designate certain armed forces which would be specially trained and held ready for prompt service on behalf of the United Nations.

Because of Russia's flagrant abuse of the veto it is apparent that we shall have to place more and more emphasis on the General Assembly. For that reason the rules of the Assembly should be changed so as to permit it to act quickly and decisively in an emergency. The time required to convene the Assembly should be drastically cut, and a permanent United Nations peace patrol, which could look into areas where international conflict is brewing, should be created. These steps, together with the special United Nations forces which I have referred to above, would give to the Assembly some of the teeth which the Security Council now lacks.

In addition to Secretary Acheson's proposals, I think we ought to work vigorously toward universality of membership within the United Nations structure. Many peace-loving nations—including Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Austria, Ceylon, Jordan, and the Republic of Korea—have been denied admission to the organization by the Soviet veto. The United Nations needs their support and they should be admitted without further delay.

In our day-to-day consideration of these and other specific problems, we should keep in constant view those long-range objectives which underlie American foreign policy. This policy is dedicated to the achievement of peace and the erection of an

international association of free peoples who work together in harmony for their mutual advantage. We seek a world in which justice, order, and progress prevail.

To achieve these objectives, we have relied and we must continue to rely on a set of basic principles which can best be described as principles for building total peace.

Principles for Building Total Peace

First. We must continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and seek to strengthen it in every possible way. The United Nations must remain the cornerstone of American foreign policy.

Second. The military strength of the free world must be increased to provide for the common defense and to enable the free nations to carry out their obligations to the United Nations and their commitments under such regional agreements as the North Atlantic and Rio Treaties.

Third. We must continue our programs of economic and technical assistance to friendly countries. A people with a rising standard of living and with hope for the future are immune to the preachments of communism. This is our most potent weapon and one for which the Kremlin can find no defense.

Fourth. As a corollary, we must work for the extension of fundamental human rights and a decent respect for the dignity of the individual to areas where these do not now prevail.

Fifth. We must do our best to help the people of the world understand, through a vigorous campaign of truth, that the democratic way of life is best. The big-lie technique of the dictators may have certain temporary advantages but the truth will always win out in the end.

Sixth. We must always remember that the core of every major world problem today is Soviet Russia. If we can solve the problem of Russia, solutions to our other difficulties will follow almost automatically. We must not be diverted from this central fact.

These principles, Mr. President, are in the enlightened self-interest of the American people. The cost will be great; but if we did nothing, it would eventually be a thousand times greater. And if we are successful, the world will enter on such a period of peace and prosperity that the cost will seem but a trifle.

Now, Mr. President, it is important that our policy and the principles upon which it is based be considered in their proper historical framework. I therefore turn to a rather detailed review of developments since 1945.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945

Mr. President, we all know the axiom that what is past is prologue. Therefore, I think that we

will be able to evaluate our prospects for peace and successful world relations by a factual recapitulation of the events of the last 5 years. Such a review will also serve to straighten out the record of what has actually happened and why.

Recently some individuals who find certain world events not to their liking have been engaged in either an unwitting or a cynical rewrite of history in their search for a reason to lay the blame at the administration's door. Such a practice does the country a profound disservice and, if continued, will be a barrier to the development of the sound and productive policy required in the future.

To obtain a true perspective on American foreign policy, it is necessary to consider the facts in their proper framework. To begin with we must return to the dark day of December 7, 1941, the treacherous Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor, and the declaration of war by Nazi Germany which followed hard on its heels.

World War II

We faced a powerful and well-armed pair of enemies. The German Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe had more than double the strength of any force that we could bring against them. On the other front, we faced a Japanese military machine of more than 5 million men, which was well entrenched in a series of defensive positions that ran in a wide arc from the home island through Oceania. As allies we had the British Commonwealth and the other signers of the United Nations Declaration. On the thesis that anyone who was fighting the Nazis would receive support, we joined forces with the U. S. S. R. against the Axis. During the 3½ years of fighting that followed, the Soviet army engaged and defeated more than 200 divisions which might otherwise have been in the line against American troops.

In support of the administration's proposed aid program—the second alternative—Secretary Marshall said:

We hope that the program we are presenting to Congress will assist in arresting the accelerating trend of economic deterioration to provide the Chinese Government with a further opportunity to lay the groundwork for stabilizing the situation. In these circumstances, I consider that this program of economic assistance proposed with the full recognition of all the unfavorable factors in the situation, is warranted by American interest.

General Marshall declared further:

We must be prepared to face the possibility that the present Chinese Government may not be successful in maintaining itself against the Communist forces or other opposition that may arise in China.

Thus, we have a responsible Cabinet officer, who at the same time is one of the great military minds of modern times, spelling out the basic element of United States far eastern policy, setting down reasons underlying the chosen course and frankly pointing out that the selected course might not prevent a Communist China.

The Eightieth Congress rewrote the administration's proposed China Aid Act, cut the 570 million dollars assistance requested to 400 million dollars, and reduced the duration from 15 to 12 months. Attempts by individual Members of Congress to provide military aid for China on the same basis as such aid was being supplied to Greece and Turkey were rejected by Congress. The then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Vandenberg], declared—

... the Committee on Foreign Relations wishes to make it unmistakably clear in this as in all relief bills that there is no implication that American aid involves any continuity of obligation beyond specific current commitments which Congress may care to make. We do not, we cannot underwrite the future.

... Your committee believes, as a matter of elementary prudence, that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting a military campaign of the Nationalist Government. No matter what our heart's desire might be, any such implication would be impossible over so vast an area.

I go into such detail over this particular step in our relations with China to establish beyond any reasonable question that this decision was approved by a Congress fully aware of the risks involved. The bill passed by the Eightieth Congress was changed in effect and cut in amount. Thus, it was completely bipartisan in character.

I should also like to stress that this was the critical decision of our China policy. When it was made, the Nationalist military strength was nearly twice that of the Communists. If it was imprudent for America to underwrite the Nationalist military effort at a time when they enjoyed a 2-1 edge, it would have been madness to have undertaken such a commitment at a later date when the situation was reversed and the Nationalist arms were in full retreat before superior Communist armies.

Supplies to Nationalist Government

Let me also say here that the China Aid Act of 1948 was faithfully carried out by the administration. Any delays in the shipment of military supplies purchased by the Chinese Nationalists with the 125 million dollars grant provided in the act arose from the failure of the Chinese Government to make its needs promptly known. Furthermore, there is not a jot of evidence to indicate that the delays, regardless of cause, were a significant factor in the Nationalist defeats. General Marshall told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1948 that between July 1946 and May 1947 "the Chinese Government had sufficient munitions for their armies and there was no embarrassment to them." As late as November 1948, Major General Barr reported, "No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment."

The vast manpower and military potential of Russia was a great asset in our struggle against

Hitler. In the interest of their own survival, the democracies, however much they detested the internal dictatorship of the Soviets, could adopt no other policy than to welcome the support of the Russian armies. Once it became apparent that the Soviet Union could survive the initial shock of the German armies, one of the most important tasks of the Allied military authorities was to keep Russian armies in the field and actively fighting against the Germans. This situation became even more acute following our landings in Normandy since any slackening of the Russian effort might have released sufficient German divisions from the eastern front to produce a military catastrophe in the west. The eastern front, which contained three-fourths of the German troops, was essential to our military campaign in Europe. The men in charge of our war effort were thinking of the quickest way to win the war and the best way to save American lives. They were not thinking of politics.

Cordell Hull, that great Secretary of State and our beloved former colleague, said:

We must ever remember that by the Russians' heroic struggle against the Germans they probably saved the Allies from a negotiated peace with Germany. Such a peace would have humiliated the Allies and would have left the world open to another Thirty Years War.

He also said that the policy to be followed toward Russia rested on two bases. The first was:

Continue in constant, friendly discussion with the Russians. Consult them at every point. Engage in no "cussin matches" with them. Explain to them, again and again if necessary, the principles upon which we felt peaceful international relations would prosper. Show them as clearly as possible the superior advantages to Russia of wholehearted cooperation with other nations as compared with the minor advantages of predominance in neighboring states. Make it clear to them that we did not object to a nation's preaching the merits of its form of government, whether communism or democracy, but that we did object to a nation's interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.

This view wasn't limited to Democrats. The late Mr. Wendell Willkie had some views about the Russians, too. This is what he said:

First, Russia is an effective society. It works. It has survival value. The record of Soviet resistance to Hitler has been proof enough of this to most of us, but I must admit in all frankness that I was not prepared to believe before I went to Russia what I now know about its strength as a going organization of men and women.

Second, Russia is our ally in this war. The Russians, more sorely tested by Hitler's might even than the British, have met the test magnificently. Their hatred of fascism and the Nazi system is real and deep and bitter. And this hatred makes them determined to eliminate Hitler and exterminate the Nazi blight from Europe and the world.

Third, we must work with Russia after the war. At least it seems to me that there can be no continued peace unless we learn to do so.

ZONAL DIVISION OF GERMANY AND YALTA AGREEMENTS

Under these circumstances, which were at the time beyond alteration, we had to agree as to the

best way to fight the war and as to what would be done when it was won. One such agreement set up zones of occupation in Germany. This was an unavoidable move; as the armies in the west and the east converged on central Germany it was necessary that a line be drawn through Germany at which they would meet. Such a line was drawn on the basis of the best judgment of our military leaders. This is the origin of the first and unavoidable division of Germany.

Our experience in Italy demonstrated conclusively that a zonal arrangement was essential for a proper administration and assignment of responsibilities in the chaos that then prevailed in Germany. Therefore, for administrative purposes Germany was divided into zones. Berlin presented a peculiar problem because of the tradition that the victors occupy the capital of the vanquished nation. It was decided that the troops of all four nations would occupy Berlin. Since that city was in the Russian zone, the right of access perforce had to be negotiated with the Soviet.

These and our other wartime agreements with the Soviets were military in origin. At the time the zonal lines were drawn, military men believed that they were east of the farthest potential advance of the western armies and that they would, therefore, result in an actual withdrawal of Russian forces from the final point of their greatest advance. The fact that the placing of these zonal lines did not so result was due to a shift in the fortunes of war which resulted in greater success in the west than we had predicted. Now that the campaign has been completed, it is easy to assert that it would have been better to have had no zonal agreements but rather that the respective armies occupy as much of Germany as they had conquered. However, it should not be overlooked that the zonal agreement forced a Soviet withdrawal in Austria.

President Truman obtained directly from Stalin an assurance that free access by rail, road, and water from the western zones to Berlin would be worked out by the commanders. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see now that some more certain arrangement would have been better. But none appeared practicable or, in fact, necessary at the time, and the risk involved was more than outweighed by the benefit of having the western powers in Berlin. Except for Germany, the present iron curtain represents, with minor variations, the eastern edge of the advance of Soviet armies into Europe during World War II. Once the Soviet armies entered eastern Europe in pursuit of the Germans, there could be no question of giving away eastern Europe. The question was what we could do to influence the course of events in areas which were under Soviet control.

In return for acknowledging the unalterable geographical fact of the presence of Soviet armies in eastern Europe, we obtained from the Russians the promise that free election would be held in

Soviet-occupied countries. These pledges have been the means by which the Soviet machinations in eastern Europe have been unmasked. Thus, the Yalta agreements have been the basis for nearly every official United States protest against Soviet moves to gain domination of eastern Europe. In no way can the record of Yalta be construed as a sell-out to the Soviet. On the contrary, it put in the hands of the United States a diplomatic weapon of great value. As a final commentary on the question of which party came off best at Yalta, there is evidence that the Soviet leaders believe that they were "done in" by these agreements. Their major objective was to obtain through the agreements a controlling interest in the great industrial complexes of the Ruhr and Saar valleys. This they were denied.

DECISIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Now there are those who say, "Look at the Far East—that was where we suffered the initial diplomatic defeat and where our representatives began to 'give China to the Communists'."

None of the facts underlying the agreements in the Far East support this contention in any way, shape, or manner. The decisions applying to the Far East were basically and essentially military decisions founded on purely military considerations. We must remember that at the time of Yalta there was still a long and hard road ahead before we could look for a German defeat. The Rhine was not crossed until March of that year.

In the Pacific, victory was even further away. American troops entered Manila on the first day of the conference. The bloody struggles for Iwo and Okinawa were still ahead. Beyond them waited a Japanese army of 5 million men which had lavishly demonstrated its willingness to fight to the death. The attached air component included at least 5,000 of the kamikaze-suicide aircraft.

The atom bomb was still a scientific question mark and could not be relied upon as a military factor.

Pacific strategy called for a tighter sea-and-air blockade and greatly intensified strategic bombing to be followed by an assault on Kyushu November 1. A landing on Honshu was scheduled for 4 months later. These operations would directly involve an American force of 5 million men and military estimates saw the war continuing into 1947 with a cost of a million casualties.

The leaders who made the decisions at Yalta relative to the Far East did not decide on the basis of politics. The compelling and overriding consideration was a quicker end to the war and the saving of the lives of hundreds of thousands of GI's. The best means to accomplish this was the Soviet entrance into the war against Japan. The timing of this entrance was of even greater importance than the fact of Soviet participation itself. Everyone familiar with the situation was well

aware that after United States forces had crushed the armies of Imperial Japan, the Soviets would declare war and cross the Amur River into Manchuria. It was further realized that nothing short of military action could stop them.

The objective, then, was to have the eastern Soviet force engage the crack Kwangtung army in Manchuria and Korea in time to prevent these Japanese from being shuttled across the Korean straits to defend the home islands against the American assault. At Yalta, the Soviet Union promised to enter the war against Japan within 3 months after the end of the war in Europe. Our military leaders were jubilant. They were convinced the Soviet promise meant the difference between death and life for scores of thousands of American troops.

In addition, the United States obtained from the U.S.S.R. recognition of Chinese Nationalist sovereignty over Manchuria and a Soviet commitment to make a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. This agreement was concluded to Chiang's satisfaction.

In return, America conceded to the Soviet no territories or rights which the latter did not formerly own or could not have taken.

There may be some who now say that they foresaw that the war in the Pacific would end as abruptly as it did. If that is true, they were very quiet about their knowledge at the time. At any rate, the Soviet Union entered the war on schedule as a result of a prudent and calculated military decision, which was richly justified by the circumstances under which it was made.

Who among the critics of Yalta will now rise and say that he would have done otherwise at the time?

That, Mr. President, is a factual review of the Yalta Agreement. I believe that when these agreements are examined by the historians of tomorrow they will be adjudged in their true character of recognizing the military realities under which they were negotiated.

Policy in Europe

Any honest review of American policy and programs will disclose a record of solid achievements. Let us take as a ready example our policy in Europe as the pivotal point of our postwar actions. Again, we must examine what has been accomplished in the light of the circumstances under which these accomplishments were achieved.

Western Europe after VJ-day was a mass of wreckage. The political structure, where it existed as an entity, was badly strained. Social patterns had been disrupted. The production of food and goods was well below prewar levels and only a fraction of the minimum needs of the continent. The organization of the United Nations had offered a long-range framework for the peaceable reorganization of international affairs.

Nevertheless, the United Nations and the United States were confronted with an emergency of staggering proportions. Hunger was widespread. Prospects for an increase in agricultural production were dim, and there was unemployment everywhere accompanied by its dangerous partner, unrest. In the United Nations, America took the lead in fast and effective remedial moves.

We contributed a major portion of the UNNRA supplies and then participated in a post-UNNRA program. In effect, these two steps enabled many of the nations of western Europe, as well as of other parts of the world, to survive.

MARSHALL PLAN

Subsequently, General Marshall, in his famous commencement address at Harvard University, made the general proposals for European reconstruction and rehabilitation which we now know as the Economic Cooperation Administration. For its inspiration and imaginative approach to problems already in the crisis stage, this action has no historic precedent.

While the infinite and puzzling details of the Marshall plan were being thrashed out, a crisis developed in Italy. Italy was a defeated nation, which in normal times could boast only meager resources, and was traditionally plagued with overpopulation and a host of other economic and social problems. This nation had been prostrated by war and was totally unable to set about her own reconstruction on anything near the required scale. There was every reason to believe that a domestic Communist Party would profit from the widespread discontent and the approaching chaos to the extent of gaining control in the election which was to come. In the fall of 1947, America put through the interim-aid program which eased Italy's immediate problems, and alleviated conditions which local Communists were exploiting. This material aid was complemented by a brilliantly executed information campaign which exposed Communist propaganda and restored faith in democracy. In the crucial election, the Communists were soundly beaten and have been unable to recover from this set-back. Here we have a prime example of a foreign policy that produced the right action on adequate scale and in time.

RED THRUST AT IRAN CHECKED

The political success scored by American policy in Italy was repeated elsewhere in western Europe and the Middle East. These instances are concrete demonstrations of the effective and steady anti-Communist character of our postwar policies in the international field. It has been almost forgotten that the United States by vigorous action in the Security Council was instrumental in checking a Soviet thrust at Iran, an oil-rich country strategically placed between the U.S.S.R. and the Arabian Sea. The Soviet army set up a puppet

regime in the northern province of Azerbaijan. On Security Council insistence, Soviet troops were withdrawn, and the regime collapsed. Since then, Soviet pressure has continued, but the Iranian Government has resolutely withstood that pressure. The United States has continued to assist Iran, and currently a survey mission is there making studies of potential Export-Import Bank projects capable of improving Iranian economic conditions.

GREEK-TURKISH AID PROGRAM

This pattern with some variations was retraced in both Greece and Turkey in the Truman doctrine. In March 1947, the Greek Government, whose continuance in power was gravely threatened by Communist-supported guerrillas, appealed to the United States for help. President Truman came before the Congress and set forth the doctrine that the United States should support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The United States subsequently gave the Greek Government enough economic and military assistance to subdue the insurrection and restore stability to the nation.

Turkey, meanwhile, was being subjected to direct pressure from the Kremlin. While the Turkish people were by no means inclined to lie down and roll over upon command from Moscow, the domestic measures the Government took to counter the threat to its sovereignty were a severe strain on the national economy. Material assistance and technical counsel from the United States enabled the Turks to step up the power of their defenses and, at the same time, ease the economic pressures that defense measures exerted. In the face of this resistance, the Russian threat was abated. The United States has boosted the determination of the peoples of these countries to preserve their own independence. So far, they have been prevented from falling into Communist control, and the Soviet drive toward the Mediterranean, the Near East, and Africa has been checked. United States policy has been an important factor in transforming this area into a cornerstone of European and Near Eastern security rather than a stepping stone for Communist conquest.

RESULTS OF AID PROGRAMS

In western Europe proper, the Marshall plan served a dual purpose. It made a vital contribution to the rehabilitation of the western democracies whose well-being is so essential a component of American security. It also dealt a severe blow to Communist hopes for penetration into the industrial west.

The economic results traceable to the postwar aid programs—particularly the Marshall plan—have been extraordinary. Industrial production is substantially above prewar levels as are most cate-

gories of agricultural production. The productivity of labor has been stepped up, and, in most of the participating nations, there has been a real improvement in the standard of living.

Besides these material advances there have been great intangible benefits. It should be noted that since the war no western European governments of either the extreme right or left have come into power. There have been no serious internal disorders and confidence in the validity of the democratic processes is strong. Everywhere there is evidence of a trend away from communism. In Austria, for example, free elections in the zone occupied by Soviet troops resulted in only a negligible fraction of pro-Communist votes.

The cooperation which has been encouraged by the functioning of the Marshall plan is exemplified in the workings of the Council of Europe. Here is a functioning international assembly that openly regards itself as a rudimentary parliament of Europe. Another example can be found in the so-called Schuman plan and in the proposals for a common organization for military production. This growing acceptance of the idea of Europe as an entity is a healthy and promising development toward a self-sustaining and peaceful Europe.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Manifestly economic strength cannot be divorced from security. As Soviet attacks on the Marshall plan increased in virulence and the aggressive aims of the Kremlin came more and more into the open, it became obvious that where we needed strong allies we had vulnerable friends. The United States, therefore, took a leading role in developing the political and military complements to the Marshall plan. The strategic interdependence of the North Atlantic countries was made open and manifest by the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty involved a revolutionary international commitment for the United States and bound the nations of the community in a defensive agreement which provided vital assurance of aid in case of aggression. It also provided for the establishment of collective, balanced forces for the joint defense of the area under an over-all strategic plan.

American policy then produced the move that would put muscle into this concept and provide our allies in western Europe and elsewhere with the weapons and matériel needed to strengthen their defenses—the mutual defense assistance program.

It should be emphasized here that both the North Atlantic Treaty and the mutual defense program are entirely and specifically within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

The occupation of Germany is now in its fifth year and can take much credit for the wholesome

changes that have been brought about in the German political and economic picture. Military government went a long way toward decontaminating the western zones of nazism and clearing the site for the reconstruction of Germany as a peaceful and productive member of the western European community. The task of reconstruction itself is the assignment of the civilian regime that is now in control of Germany.

Through the reparations program, Germany's industrial potential for aggression has been eliminated and her neighbors partially compensated for what they suffered from the war. The freely elected federal republic is functioning and by its actions has shown itself to have the possibilities of a foundation for a democratic Germany.

In Germany, as elsewhere, things have not been perfect. There have been mistakes made, and we have learned much from them. We would be less than human if that were not the case.

Although it has been lengthy, this review is by no means a complete and detailed presentation of American actions and results therefrom in Europe and the Middle East. In the over-all, it does present the factual and unprejudiced picture of what we have been able to accomplish there. To me, it borders on a triumph. Four years ago, half a continent was gutted by war; much of its productive plant was rubble. Its people were starving and communism, or equally unpalatable brands of totalitarianism, was making great strides. Today, a great economic resurgence has taken place. Much that was destroyed has been rebuilt. The standards of living have been restored, and what was politically and militarily a tinder box has been transformed into a stable area which is determined to stand up for its political liberties and is making great material sacrifices in its preparations to do so.

Western Hemisphere Relations

Before moving to another major area which has recently been the subject of some controversy, I should like to touch briefly on our foreign relations as they apply to the Western Hemisphere. The importance of our achievements in this area should not be underrated merely because they have made few headlines.

With the other American Republics, our objective has been the continued strengthening and cementing of a pattern of relationships which is already established. We have aimed at building inter-American unity for common action and at improving the economic and social structures so that the solidarity we seek will have a stable foundation. The most impressive advance in inter-American relations is the development of the Organization of American States from the patchwork inter-American system that existed 5 years ago.

At the end of World War II, inter-American agencies were loosely connected bodies that had

gone through a Topsy-like growth. Cohesion and integration of their function was notable by its absence. The basis for the OAS is the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, drafted in 1947 and now ratified by all but three of the American states. In many respects, the Rio treaty was the progenitor of the North Atlantic Pact. It is a defensive alliance under the terms of the United Nations Charter aimed at discouraging aggression. It has already proved its effectiveness in dealing with impending conflict when it was invoked early this year by the Haitian and Dominican Governments with regard to the rising tension in the sensitive area of the Caribbean. The Organization of American States swung into action. Tensions were reduced, the issues resolved, and a settlement made.

Beyond this function, the OAS has developed inter-American cooperation in a variety of fields such as health and sanitation, improvement of agriculture, the exchange of technical knowledge and skills, and economic and social development generally. A common inter-American policy and procedure for programs of technical cooperation has been agreed upon by all the nations of the hemisphere.

Chronic economic problems in many of the other American Republics have been the target of cooperative action between the United States and other nations of the Americas. Aside from material benefits derived from such action there has been a perceptible decline in the strength of the Communist elements south of the Rio Grande. The Marxist Labor Confederation—the CTAL—has been losing members to the anti-Communist labor organizations.

As a result, the American states comprise a solid community of good neighbors. The basic relations of the United States to each of the other Republics of the hemisphere are sound, friendly, and effective. In good part this situation is attributable to the shaping of an intelligent policy which has been consistently applied.

Far Eastern Policy

American policy toward the Far East involves an area of great controversy where certain critics have been raising strident cries to voice their dissatisfaction with the course of events in that part of the world. Once more, accurate perspective requires a careful analysis of developments there. It is essential to keep in mind that we are discussing a region which encompasses 2 billion people of widely different culture, customs, language, and history. We are dealing with forces whose origin stretches back to the seventeenth century and whose strength has been gathering over a period of 150 years. In these terms it is important to link closely the basis of American policy with America's capacity to execute that policy.

Certain elements have charged that American policy in the Far East sold Chiang Kai-shek down

the river and gave China to the Communists. Basically, this statement ignores the realities which confront us in the Far East. It is this sort of approach which can bring the United States to a major catastrophe. This sort of reasoning can enmesh us in a land war with Communist China from which we might never extricate ourselves. We would pour our wealth, our manpower, and our physical resources into an endless struggle on the Asiatic mainland until sheer exhaustion compelled us to stop. In the meantime, the Politburo would sit quietly by watching this epic of American folly. When we were completely stripped of our strength, the Kremlin would be quite free to move anywhere and everywhere its greedy heart desired.

In addition, this sort of thinking neglects the elementary fact that the influence and effect that the United States may exert in any particular region of the world is limited. Before we can intelligently shape foreign policy we must have an accurate and precise knowledge of those limits.

Consequently, the concept which pictures the United States as giving China to the Communists is an absurdity. Obviously, China was not ours to give, and, furthermore, the power to prevent a Communist take-over was greatly in excess of the limited influence that we could exert in the Far East.

Let us briefly examine here what actually happened to China in the postwar years.

CHINA

After the Japanese surrender, the Chinese Nationalists, under the victorious leader, Chiang Kai-shek, controlled the vast majority of the Chinese people, the bulk of its natural resources, the principal cities and lines of communication, and most of the centers of industrial production. The Nationalist Army in size, quality, and equipment was vastly superior to the Chinese Communists' Eighth Route Army.

The Nationalist regime enjoyed the active support of the United States. America provided Chiang's Government with more than 2 billion dollars in economic and military assistance. The United States command in the Pacific, by plane and ship, transported more than 400,000 Nationalist troops to Shanghai and north China to accept the surrender of the Japanese Army and to enable the Nationalists to take immediate control of the area. The United States also helped out in other ways. More than 50,000 Marines were moved to north China to help the Nationalists take over.

By any reasonable yardstick, the Nationalists stood to win the postwar struggle with the Chinese Communists hands down. Yet, in 4 years, they were chased off the mainland of China to the island of Formosa.

How could this happen?

What were the factors in the situation which surmounted the Nationalists' enormous advan-

tage and physical strength in such a short time? An informed consensus on the Chinese civil war is that a trio of intangibles brought on the Nationalist downfall. They were the factors of morale, leadership, and public support. It is undeniable that, as compared to the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists had the will to fight, were ably led, and were fully aware of the importance of public support. This is the unpleasant fact, and we must accept it. We have direct evidence to this effect as late as November 1948 in Major General Barr's report to the Department of the Army. The general was submitting a professional report as a professional soldier in the discharge of his duties as the Director of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group. He said:

Their (the Chinese Nationalists) military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many of the morale-destroying factors leading to a complete loss of will to fight.

As Communist strength rose and the Nationalist power declined, the decisive character of these intangibles became painfully clear. For the United States, they posed a grave question. What should we do about it? There were two alternatives. We might pour aid into China on an even more massive and increasing scale. Such a course would have placed an incalculable burden on an already heavily loaded American people and would have constituted a major dissipation of American resources. It might well have placed United States armed forces in China in a sordid and pointless repetition of the Japanese venture there.

The alternative was to try to induce the Chinese Nationalists to correct the fatal weaknesses in their administration. It was suggested that United States aid would be used not only to counterbalance those weaknesses but as an inducement to the Chinese Nationalists themselves to correct them. At the same time, of course, the aid would provide an opportunity for the Nationalists to take the necessary remedial steps. The decision to try this course was adopted on completely realistic grounds. It was recognized that it probably would not succeed unless the Nationalists used the opportunity given them to help themselves.

General Marshall's Analysis

In February 1948, then Secretary of State Marshall gave the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations of the Eightieth Congress a careful and detailed analysis of the situation in China. He warned against the first course of action in which the United States would assume any direct responsibility for the conduct of the civil war in China or for the Chinese economy, or both.

He stated:

It would be impossible to estimate the final cost of a course of this magnitude. It would involve this Government in a continual commitment from which it would be practically impossible to withdraw and it would very probably involve grave consequences to this Nation by

making China an arena of international conflict. An attempt to underwrite the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government's military effort represents a burden on the United States economically and a military responsibility which I cannot recommend as a course of action for this Government.

Experts estimate that in the 4½ months from the fall of Tsinan in September 1948 to the fall of Peiping in January 1949 the Nationalists lost 400,000 rifles. Foreign observers of the entry of the Chinese Communist forces into Tsinan, Peiping, Nanking, and Shanghai remarked on the high proportion of those forces which was equipped with American arms. From this, it is logical to assume that American military equipment provided to the Nationalists would likely be a major source of the arms which the Chinese Communists would use in any attack on Formosa. How can it be argued that the Nationalists lacked the military equipment required to defeat the Communists but had sufficient to provide from the stocks a major source of weapons for the Communists themselves? The Communists looked upon the United States as their quartermaster and Chiang as their supply sergeant.

It is further impossible to argue seriously that the course of military events on the China mainland would have been significantly altered by United States military advice short of the virtual taking over and running of the entire Chinese military establishment with the probable inclusion of American military units.

There is evidence which conclusively proves this. General Wedemeyer and later General Marshall warned the Nationalists against overextending themselves by attempting to occupy Manchuria before they had consolidated their position in North China. The advice was disregarded. As a result, the cream of the Chinese Nationalist armies was lost in Manchuria. General Barr was authorized to provide operational counsel informally to the Generalissimo, the Minister of National Defense, and the Chief of the Supreme Staff. His own record of attempts to offer advice, which in most cases was rejected or not acted upon, is set forth in detail in the China white paper.

Nationalists Lost Popular Support

Another step in the decline of the Nationalist cause was foreseen in another report by General Barr to the Department of the Army. Essentially, this dealt with the Nationalists' loss of popular support. Barr informed headquarters:

It is extremely doubtful that the National Government could muster the necessary popular support to mobilize sufficient manpower in this area (South China) with which to rebuild its forces even if time permitted. Only the employment of United States armed forces to block a southern advance of the Communists, which I emphatically do not recommend, would enable the Nationalists to maintain a foothold in southern China against a determined Communist advance. . . . The complete defeat of the Nationalist Army is inevitable.

Unfortunately, it required only a few months to

establish General Barr as a competent military observer and tragically, a true prophet.

Thus, we see that the Communist victory in China came about because of the political, the moral, and the military weakness of the Nationalist Government. They did not lack for men, weapons, or equipment. Such economic aid as was needed was provided by the American Government. The factors that brought about the fall of the Nationalists in China were the intangibles of successful and effective government which no outside party can supply. If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that whether we like it or not, the influence of American policy in China was incapable of overcoming these shortcomings of the Chinese Nationalist Government. We took a calculated risk in extending to that government the maximum practical aid and technical counsel. Through no fault of American policy, Chiang misused the aid, ignored the advice. The Nationalist cause collapsed through its own incompetence.

Question of Formosa

We now find ourselves confronted with the latest edition of our China problems—the question of Formosa, which is now the seat of the Nationalist Government. Here again is the time for uncompromising realism and for a willingness to analyze facts as they are in terms of American interest. United States policy on Formosa was enunciated publicly by the President in early January of this year. This policy was founded on the best professional conclusions available to the American Government. Before this decision was reached, all available information on the Nationalist capacities for staging a successful defense of Formosa pointed to an unwelcome conclusion, namely, that without the use of United States Armed Forces in the island's defense, it would fall to the Chinese Communists sometime before the end of this year.

The second factor in this policy was a repeated and reexamined appraisal of the strategic importance of Formosa to the United States by the highest military authorities in the Government. This evaluation considered Formosa not only as a land mass in a limited geographic area but in terms of the world situation. The evaluation acknowledged that strategic as the island of Formosa was, it was not vital to our defense and that under the then-existing conditions was of insufficient importance to justify the use of American forces to protect it.

I emphasize that this is a professional evaluation and is not to be confused with one which has been advanced that "a little military aid" from America would enable the Chinese Nationalists to hold Formosa. This January decision was importantly affected by the adventure and aggression upon which the North Korean Communists embarked several months ago. The United States

lived up to its stand against aggression and, at the request of the United Nations, sent military units to South Korea. This move added a fresh military factor to the Formosa equation. With United States troops in combat on the Korean peninsula, it was regarded as sound military tactics to safeguard their flank by taking special steps to ensure that the island of Formosa was neutralized. The Seventh Fleet was given this mission.

This by no means constitutes a reversal of policy but rather an adaptation of policy to a new and dominant factor.

The facts of China may be hard to swallow. But they must, nevertheless, be taken into account in the policy which is being shaped to advance American interests in the Orient.

Presently, for example, that policy does not contemplate United States recognition of Communist China. We continue to oppose the admission of Mao's representative to the United Nations. In the future, as in the past, we will do all in our power to keep China free of Soviet control.

Our policy recognizes that in acting in the Far East, America must respect the interests of India, Pakistan, and other nations in that area. Despite arguments to the contrary, it would be a serious error for the United States to go ahead entirely on its own to settle the question of Formosa. It is properly a United Nations problem and should be handled by that organization.

KOREA

At this point, I should like to clarify the pattern of American actions toward Korea and, at the same time, correct some distortions of American policy and action on that troubled peninsula. Prior to June 25, when the Communists invaded the fledgling independent Republic of South Korea, the United States had followed a steady policy of strengthening the new Nation both economically and militarily.

As far as Korea is concerned, the United States Government has religiously lived up to its declarations initially made at the conference in Cairo in 1943. At that time, the parties to the conference stated their determination that Korea should be independent. This guarantee was reaffirmed at Potsdam and was joined in by the Soviet when they formally declared war on Japan. We have not, and will not, abandon that stand.

The division of Korea along the line of 38th parallel had its origin in General Order No. 1 issued by General MacArthur in September 1945. Under this order the Soviet commander was to accept the surrender of all Japanese forces to the north and the American commander those in the south.

In short order, it became apparent that the Soviet intention was to create an oriental version of the iron curtain. The American commander tried vainly to negotiate with his Soviet opposite to reunite the country and then referred the prob-

lem to a higher level. The Moscow agreements, in late 1945, gave rise to the hope that a workable formula for unification had been reached. For 2 years the United States tried to transform this hope into a reality. We then referred the problem to the United Nations, and this resulted in a United Nations resolution in November 1947 calling for elections throughout Korea under the observation of United Nations representatives.

The Soviet masters of North Korea barred the United Nations Commission and ignored the resolution. Notwithstanding, the American Government steadfastly continued to do all in its power to carry out its stated policy and went ahead with the establishment of a representative and independent government in South Korea. Thus, 3 years after VJ-day at least a part of Korea had the freedom so long denied it.

U.N. Resolutions Followed

Subsequent United States actions, with regard to troop withdrawal, aid to Korea, and other commitments to the new republic were conditioned by the declarations of the United Nations Assembly and by the dictates of American strategic responsibilities on a world-wide basis. The resolution we introduced in the United Nations on the withdrawal of troops—both Soviet and American—from all of Korea was based in large part on an estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs believed that in terms of its own military security America had only a minor strategic interest in maintaining troops in Korea. This judgment took cognizance of the shortage of military manpower and our responsibilities and interests in other world regions which were of more vital concern to us. As an added consideration, the American Government believed that the maintenance of an occupation force on South Korean soil would retard the efforts of the South Koreans to ready themselves for self-government.

In September of 1948, we began a gradual reduction of our forces of occupation in Korea. This was brought to a halt in November because of unsatisfactory local conditions and because the United Nations General Assembly had not yet taken action on the Korean problem. On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly recognized the lawful character of the Government of the Republic of Korea and again recommended the withdrawal of occupation forces as soon as possible. Then out of a clear sky, Christmas Day 1948, the Soviets announced complete withdrawal from North Korea. As usual, they refused to allow any verification by United Nations representatives.

In March of 1949, the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council again directed their attention to the problem of South Korea. Under the circumstances that then obtained, military withdrawal was held desirable. In view of the Soviet withdrawal, the United

States could not allow itself to be placed in the position of refusing to comply with the United Nations directive. But we also resolved to back the South Korean Republic politically, economically, and militarily. All American troops, save an advisory group of 500 officers and men, left Korea in June 1949.

In March 1949, the Republic of Korea had a "security" force amounting to 114,000 men. However, the Republic's economic situation made it incapable of supporting a larger army or of maintaining the more complex types of military equipment.

The Korean Army of 65,000 men had been equipped in large part with American weapons. A 4,000-man Coast Guard force and the police contingent of 45,000 had United States sidearms and carbines and Japanese rifles in equal numbers. They had been trained by American officers.

Korean Security Problems

The best military judgment at the time set down three Korean security problems in order of priority. The first was internal Communist revolt, the second violations of the northern border, and third, open war with North Korea. On the basis of this estimate, the National Security Council concluded that the United States should complete the equipment of the 65,000-man army, that vessels necessary for the Coast Guard should be made available, and that the Republic of Korea should get a stockpile of maintenance supplies adequate for 6 months replacement plus an emergency reserve.

I would like to call to your minds, at this point, that the United States had many commitments for military assistance in other sectors: To the North Atlantic Treaty nations and to Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Philippines, and "the general area of China." In terms of the strategic estimates of the importance of these nations, Korea was being helped quite generously. Critics may now declare that our military men, or the members of our National Security Council, should have realized that war was going to break out in Korea and cut down on assistance to our other allies. The fact is that they didn't anticipate the move—and some of those who are most vociferous in their attacks voted against aid to Korea when it came before the Congress. These critics also ignore the probability that if we had engaged in an all-out military build-up in Korea, the Communists would probably have stirred up trouble in Indochina or in Iran or any one of a half dozen other spots.

But, as is clear from this history, United States handling of Korea proceeded on a basis of our entire world position. There is a risk in any policy. The sure thing does not exist. The judgments made on South Korea were carefully thought out. They were arrived at on the basis of the best available information.

Extent of United States Aid to Korea

We are now hearing charges from some quarters that the United States should have given substantial military assistance to the South Koreans. The record shows that we did. We gave them arms, originally valued at 57 million dollars and the replacement cost of which was more than double that amount. Included in this equipment was more than 100,000 Garand rifles and carbines, 2,000 machine guns, 50 million rounds of 30-caliber ammunition, and a substantial number of heavier weapons. These included 60 and 80 millimeter mortars, 105 millimeter howitzers, and 57 and 37 millimeter guns. We also turned over to them thousands of grenade rockets and grenades, 150 bazookas with 44,000 rounds of ammunition, and an assortment of armored cars, trucks, thousands of mines and demolition charges, a substantial amount of signal equipment, 79 vessels, and liaison aircraft. In addition to these arms, we gave them 85 million dollars worth of gear which had military value such as tractors, trailers, motors, generators, barges, and medical supplies. When the size of the South Korean Army is considered, this adds up to substantial aid.

The foregoing is in addition to nearly 470 million dollars in economic aid which was provided to help South Korea get on her feet.

When the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was developed, Korea also came in for consideration. The MDAP appropriation of late October 1949 contained 10.2 million dollars for South Korea. In what must be an attempt to twist the Administration's execution of this program, we now hear that South Korea got only \$200 worth of wire before the Communist attack. It is unnecessary to comment on the unfair inference that this was all the military aid that South Korea received from us at any time. But it is essential to bring out that it was clearly understood that these funds were to be spent in part for equipment that was on hand in the United States but would require from 6-9 months to put in shape. The remainder was to go for new equipment which under no circumstances could be produced in less than a year.

Furthermore, the act required that before aid could be given an agreement must be negotiated with the recipient nation. On passage of the act, talks were immediately begun with the South Korean representatives and the required agreement completed January 26, 1950. The specific items most urgently needed were determined by the South Korean Government and their advisers in the latter part of March of this year.

We provided available equipment as fast as the South Koreans could absorb it and as quickly as was consistent with maintaining the strength of our own Armed Forces. The performance of South Korean troops in combat is testimony to the effectiveness of the job done in organizing, training, and equipping them.

United States Return to Korea

Now it may be asked, if the United States withdrew its troops from Korea, why did we send them back again? For an authoritative and cogent statement on this development, I can do no better than to quote President Truman. The President declared:

This outright breach of the peace, in violation of the United Nations Charter, created a real and present danger to the security of every nation. This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of contempt for the United Nations, since it was an attempt to settle, by military aggression, a question which the United Nations had been working to settle by peaceful means.

The attack on the Republic of Korea, therefore, was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specific actions taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this challenge had not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the United Nations would have been all but ended, and the hope of mankind that the United Nations would develop into an institution of world order would have been shattered.

PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

Against the charge made by some that the United States has no policy in the Far East or that it has been a failure, I submit that America has followed a positive and consistent course of action. We climaxed 50 years of friendly cooperation in the Philippines by granting them their independence in 1946. Because of the suffering of the Philippine people from war and Japanese occupation, the United States has lent a hand in the rehabilitation of that country through the War Damage Commission and an extensive program of reconstruction under the Rehabilitation Act. We have given and will continue to give the Island Republic additional assistance via trade and military agreements. The more pressing economic problems will be tackled on the basis of studies by a special economic survey mission to the Philippines which was appointed by President Truman.

South of the new Philippine Republic is another new member of the democratic commonwealth which was assisted in gaining its independence by the good offices and the good will of America. I refer to the new Republic of Indonesia. We have given the new nation economic aid to help it over the bumps that a new organism must face in its early stages. Last January, a loan of 100 million dollars was earmarked for the new Republic and 40 million dollars provided out of ECA funds. We will support Indonesian participation in international organizations and stand ready to supply it with the constabulary equipment it may need to stave off internal Communist threats.

INDOCHINA AND THAILAND

While the United States recognizes that Indochina is primarily a responsibility of the French Government, we have urged the French to assist

the Indochinese people toward greater independence. We can rightfully take a substantial share of the credit for the new status of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and for the independent status the Vietnamese have achieved. We are now prepared to extend a helping hand to the Vietnam Government in its struggle against a Communist-supported revolt. We are giving the French and Vietnamese forces that are fighting communism the equipment required to put down the Communist subversion. We also plan a continued program of economic aid.

Thailand, the oldest independent country in southeast Asia, also faces economic and military difficulties. Here again the United States is standing by with an assistance program designed to enable the Government to main its territorial integrity. American economic aid to Thailand has been instrumental in restoring that nation to a relatively healthy economic and financial condition.

Our occupation of Japan has been signally successful. Under the administration of General MacArthur Japan has made great strides toward establishing a working democracy. The Japanese are making an economic comeback which, if continued, will permit them to stand on their own feet without need of United States support.

The United States Far Eastern policy is essentially the same as our policy in other parts of the world. We recognize a fundamental need for world conditions in which freedom can thrive. We seek in Asia groups of people governed by institutions of their own creation and by men of their own choosing.

We aim at active participation for the nations of Asia as full and equal members of the international community. We are endeavoring to assist in the establishment of an Asia which will be secure from aggression of any sort and the nations of which will settle their disputes among themselves by peaceful means. We will assist them where we can in the development of their resources, in the raising of their standard of living, and in a maximum increase in mutually beneficial trade. We look for a rich and free interchange of cultural values with them and a friendly association of peoples and governments over a broad spread of political, economic, and cultural matters.

OTHER ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

An inspiring component of our present-day foreign policy is the Point 4 Program which is now getting under way. For a relatively small cost, underdeveloped areas throughout the world may obtain technical assistance and valuable know-how to help in coping with local agricultural and industrial problems which have been depressing the local standard of living.

The pattern for this effort was laid down in

Latin America where technical cooperation has some remarkable accomplishments to its credit. Experience gained in this hemisphere serves as a valuable guide for the extension of these activities to other areas of the world. This program is one which has a real and deep meaning to other peoples everywhere. It is an inexpensive means whereby the United States can help itself by helping others.

International Information

I have so far said nothing of the aspect of American foreign policy represented by our program of international information. Through this effort peoples the world over are given an accurate and well-documented portrayal of the United States, its aims, and its people. We have engaged in a battle of words with the Kremlin propagandists to counter the Soviet effort to poison world opinion against us.

We have become increasingly aware of the importance of our information program, and this Congress has allocated the Voice of America and its allied services increased funds to do the job that must be done. Technical problems, which are extremely difficult, are being overcome. Our broadcasting gives evidence of making significant penetration of the iron curtain. The past 6 months has seen a substantial increase in audience mail, notably 318 percent up from the Far East and a boost of 824 percent from the Near East and South Asia. There is a growing response to the news and feature services that parallel the Voice broadcasts and a wider and wider demand for the motion-picture service. I might add that the Voice is receiving more and more compliments from the Soviet and satellite press and radio in the way of slanderous description of what it is trying to do and what it says. Although we spend only a fraction of what other nations spend on their propaganda, we are, nevertheless, getting results.

The growing effectiveness of our information program derives, I believe, from the fact that it is devoted to the truth. We will continue this campaign of truth to a point where no hostile or ignorant source can distort or twist American actions or American motives. At this point, we shall have achieved the basic international understanding which is an essential to the foreign policy that we have developed.

Participation in U.N.

As has been said before, the key to United States foreign policy is the establishment of lasting world peace. The major means to this end is the United Nations to which the United States Government has given its unflagging and wholehearted support. I believe that the record of

American actions in the United Nations is one in which we can take great pride.

Our proposal for the control of atomic energy is certainly a case in point. When we had exclusive control of the atom bomb, we took the lead in proposing means for its effective international control. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan, with some modifications, became the majority plan for atomic control in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. This plan was blocked by the Soviet Union which advanced a deceptive substitute that failed utterly to win outside support.

We have worked hard and successfully to develop the parliamentary functions of the United Nations and have striven for a more restrained use of the veto. We have consistently supported proposals to admit to membership the states of Jordan, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Republic of Korea. We have pledged 12 million dollars to the Technical Assistance program and have made sizable contributions to the children's fund and the Palestine refugee program. We have consistently promoted respect for basic human rights and attempted to obtain increasing recognition for individual liberty.

In many of these efforts, we have fallen short of our objectives because of the unrestrained obstructionism of the Soviet Union. The Soviet use of the veto has played a dreary and discordant obligato to the attempts of the free world to advance the cause of peace.

There are those who now claim that the United States failure to insist on a limitation of the veto power in the discussions that preceded the creation of the United Nations was a major error. This is bad vision, even for hindsight. It was clear then that any limitation of the veto power beyond that agreed to at Yalta would have prevented Soviet participation in the United Nations. It is obvious that a United Nations in which the Soviet is participating, even with an excessive use of the veto, is better than no United Nations at all.

The fact is that the United Nations is the cornerstone of our hope for peace. Our willingness, yes our determination, to seek peaceful means of accommodation with the Soviet Union through the mechanism of the United Nations has been and remains the great source of power in American foreign policy.

The American people know that their Government has made and is continuing to make every effort for peace. A war-weary Europe also recognizes this and is, further, well aware that the intransigence of the Soviet Union is the main barrier to achieving the peace. The populations of the Near East and the Far East have perhaps not fully recognized this until recently—but are rapidly becoming aware of it.

In short, our work with the United Nations has won us a vital position of moral leadership of the free world. We are now placed so that we can go forward with the immediate task of strength-

ening the free world against the forces of aggression until such time as the Soviet Union chooses to abandon its role as a disturber of the peace and returns to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

When the Soviet puppets in North Korea launched their attack on the free Republic of South Korea, 53 of the 59 members of the United Nations joined in a concerted defense of the Republic. This is a convincing demonstration of the growing power and effectiveness of the United Nations and will perhaps go down in history as the point at which a fledgling organization achieved maturity. I am convinced that as the months pass, the effectiveness of the United Nations with our vigorous support will continue to grow. We now can look forward to a not-far-distant time when the United Nations will have acquired the power to discharge the duties for which it was created.

This, Mr. President, is our hope and our salvation.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Supplemental Estimate of Appropriation—Military Assistance to Foreign Nations. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a supplemental estimate of appropriation to provide military assistance to foreign nations, fiscal year 1951, amounting to \$1,178,023,729, in the form of an amendment to the budget. S. Doc. 194, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 3 pp.

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Ireland, With Protocol Relating Thereto. S. Ex. Rept. 8, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive H, 81st Cong., 2d sess.] 4 pp.

Annex to International Telecommunication Convention—Telegraph Regulations (Paris Revision, 1949) and Final Protocol. S. Ex. Rept. 9, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive J, 81st Cong., 2d sess.] 9 pp.

Convention on Road Traffic, Dated September 19, 1949, and Signed on Behalf of the United States of America and 20 Other Countries. S. Ex. Rept. 10, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive O, 81st Cong., 2d sess.] 7 pp.

Convention With Panama With Respect to the Colon Corridor and Certain Other Corridors in the Canal Zone. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama regarding the Colon Corridor and certain other corridors through Canal Zone, signed at Panama on May 24, 1950. S. Ex. Q, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 8 pp.

Convention With Canada, Modifying and Supplementing the Convention and Protocol Relating to Income Taxes. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the convention between the United States and Canada, signed at Ottawa on June 12, 1950, modifying and supplementing in certain respects the convention and accompanying protocol for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes, signed at Washington on March 4, 1942. S. Ex. R, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 14 pp.

Peace and Security for the Future of Korea

*by Ambassador Warren R. Austin
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

I shall speak briefly, because events require us to act quickly.

I shall speak with restraint, because the death and destruction in Korea are themselves the tragic evidence of the evil and cost of aggression.

I shall speak frankly, because the issue before us involves more than the peace and security of Korea.

The United Nations was defied when the Commission created by this Assembly was prevented by the Soviet occupation authorities from observing elections in the northern area.

The United Nations was defied when Soviet occupation authorities installed a puppet regime which, according to the Assembly's Commission, ruled only by right of a mere transfer of power from the Soviet Government.

The ultimate defiance of the United Nations was aggression by the North Korean regime.

Defiance of the will and authority of the United Nations endangers the peace and security of every member nation.

The origin and nature of the North Korean regime cannot be disguised. That origin was justification for my Government, on June 27, asking the Soviet Government to use its influence to halt the invasion and restore the peace. That request was rejected. Instead, the representative of the Soviet Government, since the first of August, has used the Security Council of the United Nations as a forum in which to deny the aggression and justify the action of the North Korean authorities.

Preparation for aggression in North Korea could have been prevented. The launching of aggression from North Korea could have been stopped. The support of aggression from North Korea could have been withheld. None of this happened. The United Nations has had to suppress this aggression by force.

Turn From the Past Urged

Now we must turn from the past and consider the future. As we do so, two facts should be emphasized. First, the people of the world will not accept the standards of conduct represented by the Korean aggression. Second, the Government and the people of the United States, for their part, wish to cooperate with the Soviet Government as well as the free members of the United Nations to build the kind of world community envisaged by the Charter.

Practical men face facts. These are two of the basic facts about the world in which we live. If these facts are faced, particularly by the Soviet Government, we can turn to the task before us with increased hope and confidence for the future of mankind.

Today, the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory. The operations authorized by the Security Council have been conducted with vigor and skill. The price paid has been high. The sacrifice in anxiety, sorrow, wounded, and dead must be abundantly requited. A living political, social, and spiritual monument to the achievement of the first enforcement of the United Nations peace-making function must be erected.

The opportunities for new acts of aggression, of course, should be removed. Faithful adherence to the United Nations objective of restoring international peace and security in the area counsels the taking of appropriate steps to eliminate the power and ability of the North Korean aggressor to launch future attacks. The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.

Question of 38th Parallel

The political aspect of the problem identified with the 38th parallel becomes a matter of major

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Sept. 30 and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

concern for the United Nations. The question of whether this artificial barrier shall remain removed and whether the country shall be united now must be determined by the United Nations.

An ancient people has waited long and suffered much for freedom, independence, and unity. On three occasions, the General Assembly has registered its support of these objectives. The General Assembly sent Commissions to Korea to assist in carrying out these aims. Its Commissions have not been allowed to operate north of the 38th parallel, to observe elections, to ascertain whether the people were free to express their will, or to accomplish the peaceful unification of Korea.

The artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason. Neither the United Nations, its Commission on Korea, nor the Republic of Korea recognizes such a line. Now, the North Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied the reality of any such line.

Whatever ephemeral separation of Korea there was for purposes relating to the surrender of the Japanese was so volatile that nobody recognizes it. Let us not, at this critical hour and on this grave event, erect such a boundary. Rather, let us set up standards and means, principles and policies, according to the Charter, by which all Koreans can hereafter live in peace among themselves and with their neighbors.

The great opportunity given by victory inspires dedication rather than rejoicing; responsibility rather than revenge, consecration rather than recrimination. In that spirit, we should consider the political action required of us that will contribute to enduring peace.

The Korean people should have the right to live free from pressure and intimidation. We should seek here a solution that will not further the interests of any one country but which would be for the benefit of the Korean people and the whole United Nations.

The United States, therefore, welcomes the declaration in the draft resolution before you that United Nations Forces would remain in Korea only as long as is necessary to carry out the General Assembly's recommendations. My Government hopes, in fact, that the major portion of this effort will be carried out by units of the United Nations Forces from countries other than the United States. We would be pleased if Asian states would contribute the greatest share.

The United States does not wish to evade its duty as a member state. I have been authorized to state that my Government seeks no special privilege or position in Korea. We withdrew our forces once before from Korea in connection with the General Assembly's efforts to achieve the unification of that country. As an earnest of our co-operation toward that objective, we will do the same again.

The draft resolution clearly states one of the

most determined objectives of the United Nations—the unity and independence of Korea. At this moment, we cannot foresee the precise circumstances in which unification is to be accomplished. Even if this were not the case, we would be ill-advised to try to develop here detailed blueprints for such a complex operation. Therefore, we endorse the idea of establishing in Korea a strong United Nations Commission empowered to devise practical and effective measures for achieving United Nations objectives.

The Commission would, of course, consult with the Unified Command and with the democratically selected representatives of the Korean people. At an appropriate time, elections by secret ballot, free from fraud and intimidation, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission would have to be arranged.

Free Vote in South Cited

Free, democratic elections already have been held south of the 38th parallel. The General Assembly has formally declared the Government of the Republic of Korea, formed as a result of those elections, to be the lawfully constituted Government in that part of Korea in which the United Nations Commission was able to observe elections.

It is the territory and people of this Government that have been ravaged by war; it is the soldiers of this Government whose valor and patriotism have been strengthened by the United Nations Forces. The manner and procedures required to unify the country are functions for the United Nations to perform, but the Government of the Republic of Korea has unquestionably earned the right to be consulted in all matters relating to the future of Korea.

The future of Korea is, in a special and unique sense, the responsibility of the United Nations. That is why Secretary Acheson, in his address at the opening of this Assembly, placed particular emphasis on the task of reconstruction.

"Just as Korea has become the symbol of resistance against aggression," he stated, "so can it become also the vibrant symbol of the renewal of life."

We cannot limit our horizons to removing the scars of war. One of the fundamental purposes of our association in the United Nations is self-help and mutual assistance to remove the causes of conflict among men. We live in a world in which most of our fellow men eat too little, live too wretchedly, and die too young. We also live in a world in which misery and disease can be ameliorated if we can only learn how to marshal our knowledge and our resources properly.

The maintenance of enduring peace in Korea, and anywhere else in our world community, does not mean merely the absence of military operations. It means pushing ahead with our efforts to advance human well-being. And, as Secretary

Acheson stated, Korea is the place in which to make an historic beginning.

U.N. Program Required

Establishing a free and independent nation in Korea will require a United Nations program to rebuild the economy of Korea and reestablish its educational, health, and social institutions. The responsibilities proposed for the United Nations Unification and Rehabilitation Commission in the field of reconstruction and recovery are, in the view of the United States, particularly important. Urgent action is required so that plans can be made to mobilize the resources and equipment needed from the member states to aid the Korean people to rebuild their factories, their transportation system, their schools, and their homes.

The problem of relief and emergency rehabilitation in Korea is upon us now. We feel that the Economic and Social Council should be requested to proceed immediately to draw up a program. Urgent action also is required to prepare a program of reconstruction. The Economic and Social Council, therefore, should submit to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment, recommendations for a general program of reconstruction and rehabilitation and for the machinery to implement it.

Let us join together in Korea to develop a pattern of coordinated economic and social action which we can employ in other places where the need is not to repair the ravages of war but is for development. By focusing on one place of extreme need, the United Nations and its specialized agencies can gain strength from experience to aid peoples everywhere to combat disease, build hospitals and schools, train teachers and public administrators, build and operate factories, and obtain more food from the land.

Ways To Solve Korean Problem

In Korea we have learned new lessons in how to act collectively to promote security. The lessons give endless promise. Let us now learn new lessons in how to act collectively to promote well-being. Here is our great opportunity to put into practical effect the basic economic and social precepts of the Covenant on Human Rights.

Let us make the United Nations the world's construction agency.

An enduring solution of the Korean problem should, in the view of the United States, include these elements:

First: Establishment of a free, independent, and united country.

Second: Establishment of a strong United Nations Commission to consult with all appropriate authorities and individuals and to make recommendations for carrying out the unification process.

Third: Selection of representatives of the Korean people in free elections conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Commission.

Fourth: Consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea in all matters pertaining to the future of Korea.

Fifth: Vigorous United Nations efforts to assist the reconstruction and development of Korea.

Sixth: The retention of United Nations forces in Korea only as long as is necessary for the achievement of United Nations objectives.

Seventh: Elimination of special privileges for any nation and the development of friendly relations with all.

And eighth: Admission of Korea to the United Nations and assumption by her of the obligations, duties, and privileges of membership.

These elements for an enduring solution of the Korean problem are all contained in the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Australia, Norway, Netherlands, Brazil, Cuba, and Pakistan. My Government is glad to declare its wholehearted support of that resolution.

New General Assembly Agenda Items

The following additional agenda items¹ were adopted by the fifth regular session of the General Assembly on September 26, according to United Nations document A/1400: under refugees and stateless persons, draft convention relating to the status of refugees; and also united action for peace; declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations; and complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding aggression against China by the United States of America.

Geoffrey Parsons Named NAC Information Adviser

Geoffrey Parsons, Jr., has been named information adviser to the deputy United States representative in the North Atlantic Council, Charles M. Spofford, the American deputy announced September 29. Mr. Spofford said that Mr. Parsons will also be a member of the International Information Section for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has recently been organized by the Council deputies.

¹ See BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1950, p. 304 and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 425.

Korean Problem Illustrates Great Decisions To Be Made by United Nations

Interview of Secretary Acheson by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt¹

MRS. ROOSEVELT: In your speech to the General Assembly, Mr. Secretary, you spoke of this session as a meeting of decision. Was it your thought that the special importance of this session arises chiefly out of the Korean issue?

SECRETARY ACHESON: Yes, Mrs. Roosevelt, Korea both raises and illustrates the great decisions which have to be made by this General Assembly. The first one, I think, is in the area of collective security. When the aggression took place against Korea, the world held its breath for a moment, and, then, when the United Nations made that historic decision to throw all the force of its members against the aggression, I think the world turned a corner and peace became infinitely more possible.

The task which we have in this General Assembly is to organize the collective security of those members who wish to maintain peace. As you know, the United States delegation has put in several proposals which are calculated to do just exactly that.

MRS. ROOSEVELT: You have said, Mr. Secretary, that the Korean problem involves several issues of importance before the United Nations. You had in mind, I suppose, also the problem of the reconstruction of Korea after the fighting has ended?

SECRETARY ACHESON: I had it very much in mind, Mrs. Roosevelt. The whole purpose of building collective security is that behind the shield of that security we can go forward with the great constructive work of human life. And here is a place where we can begin. Korea has been devastated by war. The United Nations has stopped that aggression; has brought that war very close to an end. Now, the United Nations

can demonstrate to the world how, in one place, it can bring together all the knowledge and all the power of its members to really create a life for the people of Korea with their own efforts which will be an inspiration to everybody.

We have learned a great deal in the last few years through the United Nations about working together on these common problems. In the field of health, in the field of agriculture, in industry, in building factories and schools, we have learned a vast amount as to how we can bring technical skill, through the United Nations, to the aid of individual people. All this can be done in Korea and all of this will be constructive and positive.

Of course, it doesn't make news. It makes more news for two delegates in the General Assembly to insult one another than it does for the Children's Emergency Fund to inoculate millions of children against tuberculosis. The latter is constructive—the former gets us nowhere.

MRS. ROOSEVELT: These two problems brought out by the Korean question illustrate, do they not, the two lines of activity that, you said in your speech, the United Nations should be carrying out simultaneously?

SECRETARY ACHESON: They do very clearly, indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt, and they bring out a third need—the reason why we are doing both of these things, the reason why we push forward with our collective security, the reason why we push forward with these constructive efforts, comes back to the importance of the individual human person.

And that brings me to the great importance of the work that you are doing on the Human Rights Commission. We have learned, through all of these difficult years, that we can never put off for the future the insistence upon the rights of the individual person, because it is the individual person that gives point and validity and worth to everything that we do.

¹ Made over NBC television program on Oct. 1 and released to the press on the same date.

Let Freedom Ring

by Philip C. Jessup
*Ambassador-at-large*¹

The peril which confronts us is that we may lose the accumulated values of our civilization and the faith which is the product of that civilization. The source of the peril is a new fanaticism called communism. It is not communism as an economic dogma developed, with vast historical inaccuracy, by Carl Marx, which is a menace. Economic fallacies take care of themselves. But it is the perverted use of communism as a slogan for the police state which has made the term a label for the peril to free peoples everywhere. This fanaticism is devoid of moral values because moral values appertain to the individual, and communism as a current political mechanism appertains to the state. Superficially, one might think that such a deification of the state as the symbol of the community is a more unselfish philosophy than our insistence upon the dignity of the individual.

The Ruling Clique

In terms of communism as it is practiced in the Soviet Union and promulgated from the Kremlin this is not true. For in reality, under this system, the state is not the community but the ruling clique. And what is the ruling clique? It is a group of cruel and selfish men intent only upon the perpetuation of their own power. To achieve this end, they use the mechanism of the police state. They use it as Hitler used it with savage cruelty, with cunning, and with contempt for the welfare of the people enslaved by their propaganda and their secret police. It serves their purpose to promote a favored elite who live in comfort or even in luxury but always in fear. There is no trust; there is only suspicion, reliance on power, and again on fear.

What inhabitant of the Soviet Union could sing "sweet land of liberty" without even a conscious sense of the falseness of the words? He

may have drilled into his being the idea that it is well that he should subordinate himself to the all-powerful state, but he could never think of himself as having "liberty." Is he a scientist? His conclusions, like his hypotheses, must conform to the state dogma. Is he a musician? His symphonies must conform not to his concepts of harmony, beauty, or art but to the decision of an oligarchy. Whatever his skill, his inspiration, or his desire, he must conform under the shadow of a great and omnipresent terror.

They say it is a revolutionary society, but they will not tolerate the revolutionary heresy "Let freedom ring." Revolution itself must, in the Communist concept, deny its meaning and become arid conformity. Revolution is only the stepping stone to slavery.

Revolution is a theme for export from the Soviet Union. It is a practice to be encouraged in other countries as a part of the strategy for enslaving them. Its practice or advocacy in the homeland is punished with death, and bare nonconformity is considered revolutionary. The shades of Bukharin and his fellow defendants in the purge trials bear eloquent witness to that fact. It is a grotesque fantasy that the most reactionary ruling clique in the world, namely, the Politburo, is able by the cunning deception of its propaganda to secure the momentary support of peoples inspired by the love of liberty. We who practice liberty have somehow failed to gain the victory which should come from standing on "the vantage-ground of truth."

Communism in Practice

In part, we are inhibited by a sophisticated reluctance to state the obvious. Yet, there is no more potent weapon in the world than the statement of the obvious when the statements are true. We found, during the war, that the best propaganda was the truth proved by experience to be the truth. This was and is because the truth so overwhelmingly proves the advantage of our posi-

¹ Excerpts from an address made at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vt. on Sept. 30 and released to the press on the same date.

tion. The Cominform pays tribute to this fact by denying their people access to the truth. Only the most deeply indoctrinated person is allowed contact with the outside world where truth is at large, and, even among this tested elite, there are constant defections.

Unconsciously, many of our writers and speakers strengthen the Soviet cause by discussing their strength. Of course, they have elements of strength. Evil always has elements of strength, because it is unhampered by respect for any of the decencies which separate good from evil.

Actually, all of the familiar patterns of Soviet action clearly reveal their weakness. They know their society is too weak to bear comparison with the free world. The iron curtain is a badge of weakness. The armies they build up behind it are vulnerable to the truth. The greatest hazard in the victorious advance of their armies in Western Europe at the end of the war was the exposure of the soldiers to the realities of Western living. Long and vigorous reindoctrination or purging was necessary to readjust them to living in their world of whips and promises.

Yet, it is not enough to preach and practice liberty despite the great moral strength which that preachment and practice engenders. The struggle for men's minds is only part of the conflict. The Kremlin seeks to control men's minds so they can control also their bodies. We must have physical strength as well.

Early Twentieth Century

I recall the surprise of the news of the summer of 1914 when the Kaiser (it is always personified in our minds) invaded Belgium. I was just about to enter college, and I had never had occasion to think much about war. It had an unreality for my generation until the Plattsburgh movement and the Mexican border incident combined with the headlines of the news from Europe to rouse us from our lethargy. Nineteen hundred and seventeen and our entry into the war came soon enough, and there has been no halcyon day since then. We did not fully realize as a nation that this was so. There was the postwar period of prohibition and speakeasies; the fabulous twenties with their huge paper fortunes; then the crash, the New Deal, Hitler, and again war. Complacency has not returned since V-J Day, but the cause of our uneasiness has been inadequately appreciated. Slowly, as is our national wont, we have begun to absorb into our being the reality with which other peoples, the French for instance, have long been familiar.

The reality is that the world is confronted with reckless and savage men who have the power to move millions into war and who do not hesitate to do so if their own personal power will be enhanced thereby. People who are permitted to

know the truth and who think do not believe that the Kremlin is striving for peace. No irresponsible bombast about our initiating war reflects the thought of the American people or of the American Government. No responsible American believes that we stand to gain from war. The anti-war statements of great military figures like Eisenhower and Marshall do reflect our national spirit. We needed no proof that we would fight if necessary. If others needed it, they received it in June when wanton aggression was loosed by Communist imperialism against the Republic of Korea.

Doctrine of Freedom

There was a new note in our response to that aggression. It was as if through our subconscious the refrain "Let freedom ring" applied not only to the mountain tops of Vermont and Tennessee and Colorado but also to those of Korea. Moreover, we did not silence the refrain as we thought to ourselves that there are other mountain tops in many other parts of the world. In Korea, we said "Let it ring" with a note of authority. It was an order. The order is being carried out by the unified command for the United Nations because 53 nations also wish freedom and not slavery under Moscow. It is a pity that the United Nations is not universal in order that all free peoples might join in the chorus.

For other mountain tops, whether in Asia, in South America, in Europe, in Africa, or in the islands of the sea, we sang "Let freedom ring" in notes of questioning, of warning, even if you like, of pleading. It was not the pleading of weakness, on bended knee, of subservience to a power which could dispose at will of our future. It was the pleading of a people who can see reason and wish that others could see it too. It was the pleading which the strong address to the weak that they may be spared the suffering which would flow from their intransigence.

There is a power in such pleading greater than the power of command, when it is backed as in our case by the greatest technological skill and productive capacity and moral stamina which the world has ever seen. It draws added strength from the truth that we seek no added power or dominion and that the world knows this to be true. It grows still stronger when, as now, it is coupled with the sound of bombs and guns used at great personal sacrifice on behalf of the United Nations and of a small gallant, freedom-loving nation established under the aegis of the United Nations.

We will not barter the freedom which rings on mountain tops or in the valleys or on the plains of any free people. Nor will we impose our ideas upon any other people.

As a matter of fact, we in America harbor the most revolutionary doctrine of all time, the doctrine of freedom or liberty. Only the staunchest and most vigorous community can retain the slogan after the first fine frenzy of the fighting

days when the yoke is thrown off. The Russians sank into the reactionary pattern at once, making freedom (of thought, of speech, of religion, of aspiration, of activity) a capital crime once the old regime was overthrown. They were too weak to tolerate freedom. The glory of the American Revolution and indeed of the whole western revolution—which celebrated the rights of man as contrasted with the rights of the state, which means the ruling clique—is its ability to retain the revolutionary slogan of freedom throughout a century and a half.

Freedom of the Press

It is commonplace with us to groan over the petty trials and tribulations which result from freedom. Fortunately, we have so far generally secured the necessary delicate balance between license and liberty. Our measure of success is the product of a quality which is a national characteristic despite numerous individual deviations. That quality is a sense of responsibility—of proud responsibility. There is in the American spirit a realization that we are the inheritors of great traditions. Something priceless has been passed on through generations into our hands and must be passed on by us, unblemished and intact. Whenever we exercise our freedoms without a sense of responsibility, damage is done to our great cause. The sometimes irresponsible exercise of the freedom of the press causes great damage to our hard-won friendship with other peoples. Not all editors scan their columns with the question in their minds, "Will this contribute to our friendship with the people of X country?" In terms of our international relations, our Government has dealt with this problem for many decades. We have pointed out, and properly, that because we have freedom of the press, no foreign government should impute to ours the frequently irresponsible statements of criticism or reproach. What is levelled at the heads of foreign governments is equally levelled at our own. Let the state which similarly permits free criticism of itself, cavil at our newspapers or magazines. Wherever there is also a free press, governments understand even though private reactions are extreme. We must always be alert to appreciate the reciprocal aspect of a free press.

Far different is the situation where the press is allowed to print only what the government permits. When *Pravda* or *Izvestia* or *Red Star* speaks in their columns from Moscow, we know that government has spoken. The Kremlin seeks to defend itself by quoting the *New York Times* or the *Chicago Tribune*, but neither it, nor any informed source, believes for a minute that those, or any other American editorial columns, parrot the dictates of the White House as all Soviet papers parrot the dictates of the Kremlin.

Anyone who has sat through endless sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and its

committees has seen the contrast. The bloc of five—the U.S.S.R. and its four satellites—speak with the single voice of the Cominform. Repetition is for them a virtue, and repetition covers not only ideas but even the verbiage. On the other side is the free world—53 or 54 nations speaking on disparate notes which are at the same time not discordant because they compose a symphony of truth and of conviction that they believe what is called in the law "The truth of the matter asserted."

Freedom in Historical Retrospect

The freedom of the modern democratic society as an enduring phenomenon is new in history. There are the prototypes of the Greek City States and of Rome and even of some primitive societies, but, in historical retrospect, these examples stand out as islands in a great stormy ocean of dictatorship and imperial rule. The free democratic English spirit ploughed its way through the ancient bulwarks of the royal prerogative and privileged nobility for centuries, but the English democracy we know was not apparent to our forebears in 1776. It was the spirit of the latter eighteenth century which drew on the deep wells of human aspiration and created an enduring free democratic society.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 seemed, for a brief historical moment, to be in this great tradition. But the revolutionary principle of freedom was soon betrayed. It was replaced by a reactionary movement which has kept the various peoples of the Soviet Union in its grip for 30 years. The course of free democracy has gone on elsewhere and has grown in strength and in human appeal. In the Soviet Union, it has been beaten into submission. Czarist Russia was symbolized by the whip, which kept the serfs in subjection, and by the bear, which kept stretching out greedy arms with claws, for more territory to satiate the imperialist urge. Soviet Russia has in reality the same symbols. The whip, the symbol of fear and the police state, is identical. The claws of the bear are now the sickle, which circles the hammer, but there is the same imperialist drive. Poland was a victim to Czarist imperialism and is again a victim to Soviet imperialism. Czarist Russia stretched its greedy claws out to Port Arthur and Manchuria and rivalled Japan for control of Korea. Port Arthur is again a Russian base wrested from China. Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang are being hacked away from China by the Communist imperialist sickle. And, now again, Korea.

The Revolution of Freedom

But, in Korea, the true revolutionary spirit of freedom, which has been kept alive all these decades in the free democratic world, has responded. In all Asia, the yearning for relief from misery

and oppression can best be met by the spirit of freedom. While the free spirit of Balts and Czechs and Poles and Hungarians and others has been beaten into temporary bloody subjection by the hammer and sickle, the national freedom of the Filipinos, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the Ceylonese, the Burmese, the Indonesians, the Indochinese, and at least some of the Koreans has been realized. It has been realized because the free world has set those peoples free. Freedom is budding too in Africa where, under the aegis of the United Nations and against Soviet opposition, independence is already being prepared for Libya and Somaliland.

We are still the revolutionaries, we of the free world in the Americas, in Europe, in Africa, Asia, and the islands of the sea. Within and among us, there still burgeon the concepts of social justice and of tolerance. Meanwhile, the modern technological version of ancient tyranny still flourishes in the vast Russian domain. The revolutionary spirit of democracy first won its liberties by force of arms. It has had to turn from the plough and the machine time and again to keep its freedom from tyranny. But its greatest strength has been the universal appeal of its spirit. The revolutionary slogan of freedom still has the greatest power. The reactionaries, whether in the Kremlin or elsewhere, try to ride the tide of freedom by pretending to accept it. Like prior tyrants, the Politburo "struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more." His propaganda "is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

There are many parts of the Charter of the United Nations which the Soviet Union ignores. It can not ignore the opening words of the Charter's preamble which begins, "We the Peoples of the United Nations. . . ." The peoples of the Soviet Union and of the states now satellites still have the longing for freedom and that longing will some day be satisfied. It will be satisfied because the revolution of freedom still has the vitality of youth and is still on the march.

General MacArthur Congratulated on Korean Victory

Message From the President

[Released to the press by the White House September 29]

I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul.

I am particularly impressed by the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force, and I wish you would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those services—Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy, and Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines, and air men—from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all and say to all of you from all of us at home, "Well and nobly done."

Reply From General MacArthur

[Released to the press by the White House September 30]

I am most grateful for your generous message which I shall transmit to the elements of this command. It will be a source of inspiration and strength to all concerned.

Surrender Terms to North Korean Forces¹

To the Commander in Chief, North Korean Forces:

The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

¹ Contained in U.N. doc. S/1829, dated Oct. 1, 1950 and transmitted to the Secretary-General by the U.S. representative to the United Nations on the same date. This surrender message was issued on Oct. 1 at 1200 Tokyo time (10:00 p.m. e.s.t. Sept. 30).

The United Nations Flag

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information September 5]

The story of the United Nations flag begins with the emblem which was prepared by the Presentation Branch of the United States Office of Strategic Services in April 1945, in response to a request for a button design for the San Francisco Conference at which the United Nations Charter was drafted and approved.

The San Francisco design was a circular representation of a map of the world, extending to the 40th parallel south, and with the 100th meridian west of Greenwich in the lower vertical position.

At the second part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary-General urged that it was desirable for the Assembly to adopt a design to be the official seal and emblem of the United Nations.

On December 7, 1946, the Assembly approved, with slight modifications, the San Francisco design. The revised emblem was described as a map of the world, representing an azimuthal equidistant projection centered on the North Pole, inscribed in a wreath consisting of crossed conventionalized branches of the olive tree.

In the earlier design, the United States had been given the central position, chiefly because it was there that the 1945 conference had been held. On the revised emblem, the vertical meridian—the center of the line of vision—falls on the International Date Line and the Meridian of Greenwich. The projection of the map previously extended only to the 40th degree South Latitude; the new design extends to the 60th degree South Latitude including all lands except the antarctic continent.

At the second regular session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General submitted a memorandum stating that the need for a United Nations flag had already been felt, and would undoubtedly be increasingly felt in the future, in connection with the work of the committees or commissions sent by organs of the United Nations to different parts of the world, as well as for use at Headquarters and at United Nations offices and Information Centers.

The Secretary-General reported that the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents had been using an unofficial flag designed by the Secretariat. This flag consisted of the official emblem, previously adopted by the General Assembly, centered on a ground of light blue and entitled: "United Nations: Nations Unies." The Commission had used the unofficial flag in order to enjoy the protection of and be identified by a neutral symbol while traveling through troubled areas or holding meetings under the jurisdiction of several countries.

The Secretary-General proposed that the design which had already been used unofficially, but without the entitling words, possessed the essential requirements of simplicity and dignity for an official United Nations flag.

On October 20, 1947, the Assembly adopted, without objection, a resolution declaring: "That the flag of the United Nations shall be the official emblem adopted by the General Assembly . . . centered on a light blue ground."

The resolution directed the Secretary-General to draw up regulations concerning the dimensions and proportions of the flag and authorized him to adopt a flag code "having in mind the desirability of a regulated use of the flag and the protection of its dignity."

A Flag Code was issued by the Secretary-General on December 19, 1947, but the Code was revised on July 28, 1950, by the Secretary-General in order to permit display of the flag by organizations and individuals desiring to demonstrate their support of the United Nations.

The Code defines the design of the flag as follows:

The flag of the United Nations shall be the official emblem of the United Nations, centered on a United Nations' blue background. Such emblem shall appear in white on both sides of the flag except when otherwise prescribed by regulation. The flag shall be made in such sizes as may from time to time be prescribed by regulation.

The text of the United Nations' Flag Code, as amended on July 28, 1950, has been issued in printed pamphlet form and is also given in press release M/665.

One clause of the Flag Code provides that the United Nations flag may be manufactured for sale only upon written consent of the Secretary-General. This consent is subject to the following conditions: that the flag is sold at a price to be agreed upon with the Secretary-General and that it shall be the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that every purchaser of the flag is furnished with a copy of the Flag Code and regulations and that each purchaser is informed that use of the flag is subject to the conditions laid down by the Code and regulations.

In the United States, eight flag manufacturing companies have received permission from the Secretary-General to manufacture for sale the United Nations flag. These companies are:

Annin & Co., 85 Fifth Avenue, New York
Dettra & Co., 35-37 West 23rd Street, New York
Paramount Flag Co., 1189 Broadway, New York, and
520 Folsom Street, San Francisco 5
Sheritt Flag Co., Richmond 20, Virginia
New England Decorating Co., Lincoln Street, Boston
11, Mass.
The National Flag Co., 1012 Flint Street, Cincinnati
14, Ohio
Standard Flag & Manufacturing Co., 716 Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia
The Valley Forge Flag Co., 200 Fifth Avenue, New
York

Integrated Force Under Centralized Command To Defend Western Europe

[Released to the press September 27]

Following is the text of the communiqué issued on September 26 by the North Atlantic Council at New York:

The North Atlantic Council reconvened today to resume discussions. The Council has been in recess since Monday, September 18. During the interval of this recess, the Foreign Ministers have been in consultation with their Governments.

The Council agreed upon the establishment, at the earliest possible date, of an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defense of Western Europe.

The concept of the integrated force approved by the Council is based upon the following principles:

1. The force will be organized under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will be subject to political and strategic guidance exercised by the appropriate agencies of that organization.
2. The force will be under a Supreme Commander who will have sufficient delegated authority to ensure that national units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war.
3. The Supreme Commander will be supported by an international staff representing all nations contributing to the force.
4. Pending the appointment of a Supreme Commander, there is to be appointed a Chief of Staff who will have responsibility for training and organization.
5. The Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be responsible for higher strategic direction of the integrated force.

The finalization by the Council of the arrangements for the integrated force must await the recommendations of the Defense Committee on the following points:

The Council has requested the Defense Commit-

tee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to work out the organization of the integrated force and to recommend the steps necessary to bring this force into being at the earliest possible time. The Council has also requested the Defense Committee to consider changes and simplifications required in the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and related military organizations and to consider how best to ensure the necessary close working relationship between the Standing Group and the member governments not represented on it.

The Council agreed that, in order to bring the integrated force into effective being, all available manpower and productive resources should be fully utilized for the defense of Western Europe. To this end, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will consider the precise character and composition of the forces to be allocated to the integrated force by member Governments. Decisions regarding the allocation of such forces will be sought from member governments at an early date.

The utilization of German manpower and resources was discussed in the light of views recently expressed by democratic leaders in Germany and elsewhere. The Council was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defense of Western Europe and, noting that the occupying powers were studying the matter, requested the Defense Committee to make recommendations at the earliest possible date as to the methods by which Germany could most usefully make its contribution.

In accordance with the policy of annual rotation of the chairmanship, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Paul Van Zeeland, has assumed the chairmanship of the Council for the coming year.

In adjourning their meeting, the Ministers reaffirmed the unity of the free peoples which they represent in their common determination to preserve the peace, the security, and the freedom of the Atlantic community.

Inter-American Economic and Social Council's Program of Technical Assistance

UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, I am, of course, deeply concerned with all matters that contribute to the economic development of the Hemisphere. Having had the privilege of serving at the first special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as chairman of Committee C, it is perhaps only natural that I should have a special interest in the implementation of the technical assistance resolution adopted at the Special Meeting on April 10.

I have followed developments since that date very closely, and I was happy to receive a few days ago a copy of the proposed technical assistance program formulated by the Coordinating Committee. I have read this program with interest, and I am impressed with the very workmanlike job which the Coordinating Committee has done. I would like to extend my sincere congratulations to Dr. Lleras, the Chairman of that Committee, and to all those who collaborated with him for the way they have carried out this difficult assignment. I cannot, of course, foresee what action the Council will take, but I would like to express the earnest hope that, whatever program may finally be adopted, it will be possible for the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to begin its technical assistance activities on January 1, 1951. This means that we will all have to put our shoulders to the wheel and, as far as my Government is concerned, I can pledge its wholehearted collaboration toward that end.

It is with this in mind that I would like to announce at this time the amount and the nature of my Government's proposed contribution to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council Technical Assistance Program. It is my Government's intention to contribute 1 million dollars to

that program during its first year, provided this amount does not exceed 70 percent of the contributions of all member governments. I am making this announcement at this time in the hope that it may prove helpful to the Council in its deliberations and that it may serve as an orientation to the other member governments.

I would like to add that our contribution to the Technical Assistance Program of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council represents only a part of the funds which my Government is devoting to technical assistance activities within the Hemisphere.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

by Ambassador Capus M. Waynick

*Acting Administrator, Office of Technical Cooperation and Development*²

I was most happy to receive an invitation to appear before members of the Council at their meeting today.

I have been told that some of the activities of the Pan American Union represent the oldest, continuous technical assistance program in the Western Hemisphere. Each of our Governments has learned much from this technical cooperation effort, going back more than 40 years in the Hemisphere. My own Government has patterned many of its activities after the original experiments conducted by the Pan American Union. We have a common interest in seeing that the Inter-American technical cooperation activities continue to grow.

My own Government became active in technical cooperation work about 1939, working directly with individual governments in the Hemisphere. This we call "bilateral" programs, as distinct from

¹ Excerpts from remarks made at the plenary session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Washington on Sept. 28 and released to the press on the same date.

² Made before the plenary session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Washington on Sept. 28 and released to the press on the same date.

the kind of "multilateral" activity conducted by the inter-American system.

Last year, my Government expended approximately 7 million dollars in the Western Hemisphere on technical assistance activities. These activities will now come under President Truman's Point 4 Program. All of you have heard of some of these activities, but I am not sure that the full scope of the program is generally known. Let me mention some examples.

Institute of Inter-American Affairs

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs is a United States Government corporation which enters into joint development activities with other governments. The Health Division of the Institute is working in 14 countries. It drains swamps, builds city water systems and city sewage systems. It organizes health clinics. It trains nurses, and mid-wives, and sanitary technicians. This is an action program.

The Food Supply Division of the Institute is organizing country-wide extension services to carry better agricultural practices to the individual farmer. It has operated grain storage facilities. It has organized farm machinery pools.

The Education Division of the Institute is concerned with demonstrations in better rural schools and in vocational schools for the city.

That has been the program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

Programs of Technical Agencies

We also have had another program conducted by the technical agencies of the United States Government, working directly with other governments in the Hemisphere.

For example, the United States Department of Agriculture has conducted general agricultural stations in 8 countries, engaging in some research and some extension services. In every country, it also investigates the improvement of local food supply.

Our Civil Aeronautics Administration has worked with a number of countries on improving air navigation facilities.

Our Public Roads Administration is a familiar name to most of your governments.

Our Geological Survey has been working in more than 10 countries to complete a geological survey of the Hemisphere with the immediate objective of helping governments to find new sources of national income.

Our Census Bureau has worked with all your governments with problems involved in the 1950 census of the Americas which is now going on. The Census Bureau has been conducting consultations and training courses for more than 5 years to prepare for this census.

Our governments have worked in a variety of other fields—in fisheries, in child welfare, in social security, in labor standards.

In all of these fields, my Government has been offering special training courses at Washington for technical employees of your governments. More than 400 training fellows are attending these courses each year.

Most of these activities were first proposed by one or another of your governments, and, each year, the activities are renewed by a formal request from your Foreign Offices, and your governments are expending, on the average, \$2.00 for every one that is spent by the United States Government on these projects.

I said that my Government spent approximately 7 million dollars on this type of activity in the Hemisphere last year. We are prepared to spend roughly 11 million dollars for this same type of work during the present year. In other words, approximately one-third the appropriation by our Congress for the Point 4 Program is already earmarked for expenditure in the American Republics.

United Nations Program

So far, I have said nothing of the United Nations program. The United Nations, under its expanded program of technical assistance will be expending approximately 20 million dollars this year throughout the world on technical cooperation. A substantial part of that budget will doubtless be spent in the American Republics, and a substantial part of that United Nations budget was contributed by the American Republics.

In my Government, we like to feel that this growing interest in technical cooperation, whether directly between governments, or through the United Nations, or through the inter-American system, is a growing force in world economic relations which will continue until the economic and social problems of the world have been substantially resolved. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council has an important role to play in this world-wide movement.

I am speaking not only of your countries, but of mine. Our own development is more advanced than some others, but we remain underdeveloped. For instance, we have only begun to protect our land from erosion and to use our surface water intelligently and well. The point I seek to emphasize is that we Americans, North, Central, and South, have a common and joint responsibility for making the most of our inheritance of land and other natural resources. Working together as good neighbors, we can convert the Western Hemisphere into the kind of home for ourselves and our children that it ought to be. The Point 4 Program is intended to promote our cooperation for this purpose.

Color Cartoon Leaflet on Korea To Be Sent to Near and Middle East

[Released to the press September 25]

One million copies of a 4-page, color cartoon leaflet on Korea will shortly be distributed in the Near and Middle East by the Department of State as part of its expanding campaign of truth to counteract Communist propaganda abroad.

The project originated with an offer by Frederick W. Danner, president of Danner Press, Inc., an Akron, Ohio, printing firm, to contribute production of the leaflets to the Department's international information and education program. M. Philip Copp of New York, publisher of *Eight Great Americans*, the initial venture of the Department of State in the use of the "comic book" as an overseas information medium, provided the art work and engravings for the leaflet.

The Korea leaflet is being initially printed in four languages, Arabic, Persian, Burmese, and English. Later it may be printed in languages of the Far East. It will supplement a wide variety of pamphlets, photographs, posters, and press material which the Department and its overseas information offices are distributing on this subject.

The leaflet tells of United States and United Nations efforts after World War II to establish a free, independent, and united Korea. It emphasizes in simple language that it was the Communists of North Korea who launched the invasion on June 25 and that the United Nations condemned the North Koreans as aggressors and called for support of the Republic by United Nations members. It further records Soviet obstructionism in Korea prior to the invasion and the continuing efforts of the United Nations to insure a free election there.

Opening with a picture of North Korean Communist tanks overrunning helpless civilians, *The Korea Story* pictorially recalls Stalin's signing of the Potsdam Agreement adhering to the Cairo Declaration guaranteeing freedom to Korea after the defeat of Japan. Subsequent pictures highlight Soviet refusal to honor her pledges regarding Korea and the holding of free elections by the South Koreans despite Communist terrorism. As the peaceful Koreans work to build up their country, after the elections, the northern Communists are pictured secretly armed for the coming invasion. Following the June 25 attack, the United Nations Security Council is shown condemning the aggression and ordering a cease-fire. A Communist plane, strafing a South Korean village, symbolizes the Communist flaunting of the United Nations demand for peace.

The booklet emphasizes statements by President Truman, Pandit Nehru of India, Gen. Romulo of the Philippines, and Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan condemning the aggression.

The earlier State Department "comic book," *Eight Great Americans*, was a pictorial history of the lives of Washington, Jefferson, and others. The success of the booklet, which is being produced in nine languages, has, Department officials believe, established the comic book technique as an effective method of telling the American story overseas.

Pakistan Signs Fulbright Agreement

[Released to the press September 25]

Pakistan and the United States signed, on September 23, an agreement putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act.

The signing took place at Karachi, with Fazlur Rahman, Minister for Commerce and Education, representing the Government of Pakistan and Avra M. Warren, American Ambassador to Pakistan, representing the United States.

This agreement was the twentieth signed under the act, previous agreements having been signed with the Governments of Austria, Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg, Burma, China, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

The agreement provides for a United States Educational Foundation in Pakistan to assist in the administration of the educational program financed from certain funds resulting from the sale of United States surplus property to that country. It provides for an annual program of the equivalent of approximately 300,000 dollars in Pakistani rupees for certain educational purposes. These purposes include the financing of "studies, research, instruction and other educational activities of or for citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Pakistan or of Pakistanis in United States schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental United States . . . including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for Pakistanis who desire to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States . . . whose attendance will not deprive citizens of the United States of America of an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions."

All recipients of awards under this act are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States.

The Foundation in Pakistan will consist of eight members, the honorary chairman of which will be the United States Ambassador to Pakistan. The members of the Foundation will include four Pakistanis and four citizens of the United States.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1950

United Nations:		
Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter.	Lake Success	Aug. 18-Sept. 12
Economic and Social Council:		
Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: Fourth Session	Lake Success	Sept. 5-
Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 8-Sept. 10
Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 20-Sept. 20
Izmir International Trade Fair	Izmir, Turkey	Aug. 20-Sept. 20
Sixth International Congress on Vineyards and Wine	Athens	Aug. 23-Sept. 2
International Law Association	Copenhagen	Aug. 27-Sept. 2
International Federation for Housing and Town Planning: 20th International Congress.	Amsterdam	Aug. 27-Sept. 2
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Forestry and Forest Products Commission: European	Geneva	Aug. 28-Sept. 1
Meeting of Herring Technology	Bergen, Norway	Sept. 24-28
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: Fifth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors.	Paris	Sept. 6-14
XXXIX General Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union	Dublin	Sept. 7-13
Country Women of the World, Sixth Triennial Conference of the Associated.	Copenhagen	Sept. 9-16
Levant Fair	Bari, Italy	Sept. 9-26
Vienna International Fall Fair	Vienna	Sept. 10-17
European Tobacco Conference	Rome	Sept. 10-13
International Scientific Radio Union: Ninth General Assembly	Zürich	Sept. 11-23
First Congress of the International Society of Internal Medicine	Paris	Sept. 11-14
Journées Rurales Internationales	Brussels	Sept. 14-16
Tripartite Meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers	New York City	Sept. 12-18
North Atlantic Council Deputies: 3rd Session	New York City	Sept. 13-
North Atlantic Council: 5th Session.	New York City	Sept. 15-16
First International Exhibition of Applied Electricity (in connection with celebration of 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Augusta Righi).	Bologna, Italy	Sept. 17-30
Pan American Sanitary Organization: Eleventh Meeting of the Executive Committee.	Ciudad Trujillo	Sept. 20-23
Fourth Session of the Directing Council	Ciudad Trujillo	Sept. 25-30
Forensic and Social Medicine: Third International Conference of	Paris	Sept. 23-28

In Session as of September 30, 1950

United Nations:		
Council on Libya	Tripoli	Apr. 25-
General Assembly: Fifth Session	Lake Success	Sept. 19-
Pakistan International Industries Fair	Karachi	Aug. 11-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: First Session	Geneva	Sept. 1-
Broadcasting Conference, Third North American Regional: Second Session.	Washington	Sept. 6-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Special Meeting on Airworthiness and Operations—on Climb Requirements.	Paris	Sept. 14-
Air Navigation Commission: Fifth Session	Montreal	Sept. 19-
Council: Eleventh Session	Montreal	Sept. 27-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of September 30, 1950—Continued

Marseille International Fair	Marseille	Sept. 16-
Biostatistics, Inter-American Seminar on	Santiago	Sept. 25-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Inter-American Seminar on Elementary Education	Montevideo	Sept. 25-
GATT: (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Third Round of Tariff Negotiations of Contracting Parties	Torquay, England	Sept. 28-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting of Fisheries Technologists	Bergen, Norway	Sept. 30-
Pacific Conference (American Society of Travel Agents)	Honolulu	Sept. 30-

Scheduled October 1–December 30, 1950

Sanitary Conference, Thirteenth Pan American	Ciudad Trujillo	Oct. 2-
Sanitary Organization, Pan American: Twelfth Meeting of Executive Committee	Ciudad Trujillo	Oct. 11-
International Council for Exploration of the Sea	Copenhagen	Oct. 2-
Fourth Meeting of Wool Study Group	London	Oct. 2-
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee	Brussels	Oct. 4-
Iao (International Refugee Organization):		
Executive Committee: Eighth Session	Geneva	Oct. 5-
General Council: Sixth Session	Geneva	Oct. 9-
Third Pan American Congress of Physical Education	Montevideo	Oct. 6-
Third Pan American Conference on Leprosy	Buenos Aires	Oct. 8-
Sixth Inter-American Press Congress	New York City	Oct. 8-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific: First Session	Bangkok	Oct. 9-
Latin American Meeting on Livestock Production	Turrialba, Costa Rica	Oct. 9-
Council: Tenth Session	Washington	Oct. 25-
Special Session	Washington	Nov. 3-
Council: Eleventh Session	Washington	Nov. 13-
Latin American Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Third Session	Santiago	Dec. 11-
International Conference on Ways and Means of Combating Plant Parasites	Rome	Oct. 3-
Seventh Pan American Railway Congress	Mexico City	Oct. 10-
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: Sixth Congress	Madrid	Oct. 12-
Silk Congress, Second International	New York City	Oct. 14-
Canterbury Centennial Celebration	Christchurch, New Zealand	Oct. 16-
Pan American Institute of Geography and History:		
Fifth General Assembly	Santiago	Oct. 16-
Fifth Consultation of Commission on Cartography	Santiago	Oct. 16-
Second Consultation of Commission on Geography	Santiago	Oct. 16-
Second Consultation of Commission on History	Santiago	Oct. 16-
Board of Governors of the League of Red Cross Societies	Monte Carlo	Oct. 16-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Middle East Regional Air Navigation Meeting: Second Session	Istanbul	Oct. 17-
Air Navigation Commission Division: Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control: 4th Session	Montreal	Nov. 14-
International Union for the Protection of Nature: Second General Assembly	Brussels	Oct. 18-
South Pacific Commission: Sixth Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 20-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Petroleum Committee: Third Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
Governing Body: 113th Session	Brussels	Nov. 15-
Textiles Committee: Third Session	Lyon, France	Nov. 28-
Committee on Work on Plantations: First Session	Indonesia	Dec. 4-
Asian Advisory Committee: Second Session	Indonesia	Dec. 17-
Asian Technical Conference on Cooperation	Karachi	Dec. 26-
International Wheat Council: Fourth Session of the United Nations:	Geneva	Oct. 24-
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Meeting of Transport Experts	Bangkok	Oct. 24-
Technical Conference on Flood Control	Simla, India	Oct. 30-
Subcommission on Iron and Steel: Third Meeting	Undetermined	December*
Economic Commission for Europe:		
Timber Committee	Geneva	Oct. 30-
Committee on Industry and Materials	Geneva	Nov. 13-
Committee on Coal	Geneva	Nov. 21*-
Committee on Industry and Materials	Geneva	Dec. 4*-
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 5th Session	Lake Success	Nov. 30-

* Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October 1 - December 30, 1950—Continued

Intergovernmental Tin Conference	Geneva	Oct. 25-
Permanent Central Opium Board: 56th Session	Geneva	Oct. 31-
Central and South African Transport Conference	Johannesburg	Oct. 25-
International Rubber Conference	Cleveland	October
Caribbean Trade Conference	Port-of-Spain, Trinidad	October
Fifth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).	Torquay, England	Nov. 2-
Third Inter-American Congress on Brucellosis	Washington	Nov. 6-
FAO-Who Panel of Experts on Brucellosis	Washington	Nov. 6-
Survey Authorities, Conference on	Wellington, New Zealand	Nov. 6-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Meeting on Improvement of Bibliographical Services	Paris	Nov. 7-
Second International Conference of University Representatives	Nice	Dec. 4-
57th Convention of Association of United States Military Surgeons	New York City	Nov. 9-
Caribbean Commission: Eleventh Meeting	Curaçao, Netherland West Indies.	Nov. 24-
West Indian Conference: Fourth Session	Curaçao, Netherland West Indies.	Nov. 27-
International Sugar Council: Meeting of Special Committee	London	November
Fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture—FAO Latin American Pre-Conference Regional Meeting.	Montevideo	Dec. 1-
Mid-Century White House Conference on Children and Youth	Washington	Dec. 3-
International Sugar Council	London	Dec. 11-

Republic of Indonesia Applies for U.N. Membership

Statement by Ernest A. Gross

Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council¹

The application of the Republic of Indonesia for admission to membership in the United Nations is made by a state, the background and origins of which are familiar recent history marking a major success for the Security Council and for the community of nations.

I say that this is familiar history because the question of Indonesia has been before this Council since the month of August 1947. There have been times when the complications of this case and hostilities made the solution of it a most serious and difficult problem. However, over and above the many difficulties, there prevailed the will of the parties, with the help of the United Nations, to settle the issues before them peacefully. This settlement, as Ambassador Austin described it to the General Assembly at its last session, "will continue to be a monument to the high statesmanship of the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia." He added, "I am confident that the majority of the members of this Assembly are already

in agreement that the basic principles on which our organization stands have been advanced by the determined efforts of all those whose labors were recently concluded at The Hague." The settlement of these issues was worked out at the Round Table Conference at The Hague, to which Ambassador Austin referred. One of the reasons that this settlement was possible was the will of the Indonesian leaders to seek the road of peaceful negotiation in their fight for freedom in order to spare their people the hardship and devastation of war and to give to the world earnest indication of their future conduct as a member of the community of nations. The Netherlands has also shown its willingness to negotiate a settlement. The agreements reached at The Hague provided for the transfer of sovereignty by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and for the creation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union which the Union Statute describes as effecting organized cooperation on the basis of free will and equality of status with equal rights without prejudice to the status of each of the two parties as independent and sovereign states. As part of the transfer agreement reached at The Hague, the Netherlands recognized

¹ Made before the Security Council on Sept. 26 and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

the aspirations of Indonesia for membership in this body and agreed to promote its membership.

Thus, the application of the Republic of Indonesia is that of a new state in Southeast Asia which has often been heard at this table and whose aspirations have steadfastly pointed toward membership in this organization. At the last regular session of the General Assembly, the Government of India was among the 14 nations sponsoring a resolution which placed on record the very wide support of the General Assembly for the action taken by the parties at The Hague and which welcomed the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state. It, therefore, seems to me singularly appropriate that, today, it is the representative of India who has suggested that the Security Council consider this application.

My own Government has watched with interest and attempted to assist in a creative way the establishment of a new and independent Indonesian Nation, and it has welcomed the formation of the voluntary Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The United States was the third member of the Good Offices Committee and is now a member of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Upon the transfer of sovereignty to which the Ambassador of Indonesia refers in his letter of September 25, the President of the United States extended recognition to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and welcomed it into the community of peace-loving nations. In a statement to the people of Indonesia, President Truman said:

The world has seen a nation grow in the vast archipelago of Indonesia. A new republic has now emerged from the chaos and destruction of war and a new state is demonstrating that it will follow the course of peace and order so that all men in Indonesia may work fruitfully in your richly endowed area to fulfill the promise of a new era.

The leaders of Indonesia have shown their statesmanship in reaching with the Netherlands unanimity of agreement at The Hague Conference and in supporting that agreement in the halls of government in Indonesia. Through wholehearted cooperation in bringing about this agreement, the leaders of Indonesia and of the Dutch people have strengthened and contributed to the development of the United Nations. They have gained for the people of Indonesia sovereignty and for the people of the Netherlands good will and assurances of fair treatment.

The United States will welcome the Republic of the United States of Indonesia into the community of free nations and looks forward to Indonesia's admission to membership in the United Nations.

In the light of this statement, it remains simply for me to say that, of course, the United States today welcomes this application of the Republic of

Indonesia. It considers that the records show that it is a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the obligations of the United Nations Charter. My Government will vote in favor of this application. In the light of the circumstances of this case and in view of the suggestion of the representative of India, I believe it entirely fitting to vote on this application forthwith without referral to the Committee on Membership.²

U.S. Delegation to International Conferences

Inter-American Seminar on Education

The Department of State announced on September 25 that the United States delegation to the Inter-American Seminar on Elementary Education, which convened at Montevideo on September 25 is as follows:

Chairman

Earl J. McGrath, United States Commissioner of Education

Delegates

Arnold Perry, Professor of Elementary Education, University of North Carolina

Francisco Collazo, Assistant Commissioner of Education of Puerto Rico

Sally Marks, Education Division, Institute of Inter-American Affairs

The countries of the Americas are cooperating closely, both within their own regional organization and as members of the United Nations, in trying through such measures as the establishment of elementary schools and the development of teaching to reduce illiteracy in the Americas.

Illiteracy in the Americas was considered at the Seminar on Problems of Illiteracy and Education, held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 27-September 3, 1949. Pursuant to a recommendation of that group, the Organization of American States, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Government of Uruguay are jointly sponsoring the forthcoming Seminar which is expected to constitute an important initial step in a movement to insure for the present school-age generation the exercise of the right to an education.

Among the specific topics with which the Seminar will deal during the course of its deliberations are: organization of primary school systems and services; plans, programs, and methods; administrative, technical, and financial problems involved in giving effect to the principle of universal, free, and compulsory education; teacher training; basic rules for the organization of inter-American rural normal-school centers; and preparation of textbooks and teaching materials.

² The application for membership of the Republic of Indonesia into the U.N. was approved by the Security Council on Sept. 26 by 10 affirmative votes and 1 abstention (China), see U.N. doc. A/1402 of Sept. 27; the General Assembly unanimously adopted by acclamation a joint Australian-Indian proposal admitting Indonesia into the U.N. on Sept. 28, see U.N. doc. A/1407 of Oct. 2. The Republic of Indonesia is the 60th nation to become a member of the U.N.

The United States in the United Nations

[September 30–October 6, 1950]

General Assembly

During the third week of the fifth session of the General Assembly, one plenary meeting was held for the purpose of elections; Committees One, Two and Five, the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and the Joint Committee held their organizational meetings and then proceeded to their agenda, while Committees Three and Six continued the substantive discussions begun the previous week. The General Committee, meeting on October 5, recommended adding five items to the Assembly's agenda. The new items include the question of the future of Formosa which was proposed by the United States; a Soviet-sponsored protest against alleged bombings of Chinese territory by the United States; and a Philippine request for consideration of a United Nations military award for the Korean war. The other two items are the Yugoslav proposals entitled "Duties of States in the Event of Outbreak of Hostilities" and "Establishment of a Permanent Commission of Good Offices," which were outlined by Foreign Minister Kardelj.

On September 29, the Assembly proceeded to the election of three nonpermanent members of the Security Council to replace Cuba, Egypt, and Norway. Brazil and the Netherlands were elected on the first ballot, but the Assembly was forced to postpone the election of the third nonpermanent member when 11 additional ballots failed to break the deadlock between Turkey and Lebanon. Elections held the same day to the Economic and Social Council were decided on the first ballot. The United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and Poland were reelected, and Uruguay, the Philippines, and Sweden were chosen to replace Australia, Brazil, and Denmark. The Dominican Republic was reelected to the Trusteeship Council on the first ballot, but two additional ballots were required before Thailand won over Burma for the seat being vacated by the Philippines.

First Committee.—Meeting for the first time on September 30 under the chairmanship of Dr. Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaiz (Colombia), Committee I (Political and Security) declared Ambassador Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium) vice-chairman and Thor Thors (Iceland) rapporteur. Following a lengthy procedural discussion, the Committee adopted a Philippine proposal to make the Korean question its first order of business and to postpone decision on the order of the other

items. A Soviet proposal to grant a hearing to both North and South Korean representatives was rejected, and the Committee decided instead to hear only the representatives of the Republic of Korea.

Following the presentation to the Committee of the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, which clearly placed the blame for the present Korean crisis on the North Korean authorities and pointed to the progress being made by the Republic of Korea in the political and economic fields, the delegate of the United Kingdom, Kenneth Younger, introduced a resolution which was cosponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, and the Philippines. This resolution contained the following recommendations: (1) that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; (2) that elections, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea, be held under United Nations auspices; (3) that United Nations armed forces should not remain in any part of Korea any longer than would be necessary to achieve the above objectives; and (4) that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea. The eight-power resolution also called for the creation of a commission to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Besides assuming the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea, the new commission would represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of all Korea and exercise such responsibility in connection with relief and rehabilitation as would be determined by the General Assembly. Finally, the eight-power resolution would request the Economic and Social Council to develop plans for Korean relief and rehabilitation upon termination of hostilities. Expressing support for this resolution, Ambassador Warren Austin (U. S.) urged that "a living political, social, and spiritual monument to the achievement of the first enforcement of the United Nations peace-making function" be erected in Korea. He also urged that a pattern of coordinated economic and social action be developed for Korea which could be used in other places requiring development.

Calling the eight-power resolution on Korea a plan to give United Nations legality to intervention and to perpetuate the occupation of Korea by foreign forces, the Soviet delegate, Mr. Vyshinsky, proposed to the Committee on October 2 that the United Nations Commission on Korea be disbanded and that the General Assembly call a halt to the "barbarous bombings of Korean civilians by the United States." A third Soviet proposal, which was co-sponsored by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine, called for: (1) an immediate cease-fire, and the withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from Korea; (2) the election of a "parity commission" at a joint assembly of the deputies of both the North and South Korean Assemblies, to organize and conduct elections throughout Korea, and to establish an interim "all-Korean" government; (3) the formation of a United Nations committee that would include representatives of states "bordering on Korea" to observe elections; (4) urgent planning, with Korean participation, by the Economic and Social Council for United Nations aid to Korea; and (5) upon the establishment of an "all-Korean government", consideration by the Security Council of Korean membership in the United Nations.

The following day, the delegate of India, Sir Benegal Rau, proposed the formation of a sub-committee in order to reconcile the differences between the eight-power and five-power resolutions. On October 4, the Committee voted on the various proposals and resolutions. The Indian proposal was rejected and all three of the Soviet resolutions were defeated by overwhelming majorities. The eight-power resolution, with some amendment, was approved by a vote of 47-5, with 7 abstentions.

Before it adjourned until October 9, Committee I decided to consider as its next order of business the United States proposal on uniting for peace.

Action in Other Committees.—The *Ad Hoc* Committee, meeting for the first time on September 30, elected Dr. V. Belaunde (Peru) as chairman, Alexis Kyrrou (Greece) as vice-chairman, and Salvador Lopez (Philippines) as rapporteur. The first question considered was the agenda item on the alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. After 4 days of debate, the Committee approved on October 5 the amended text of a resolution submitted by the Australian delegation. This resolution condemns the refusal of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania to fulfill their treaty obligations which have been confirmed by the International Court of Justice; notes "with anxiety" the continuance of serious accusations against the three Governments; and invites member nations to submit to the Secretary-General any evidence which they may have on the question. Committee Two (Economic and Financial) held its organizational meeting on October 2 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Gustavo

Gutierrez (Cuba) and elected V. Skorobogatoff (Byelorussia) as vice-chairman, and Dr. Jose Vilfan (Yugoslavia) as rapporteur. The same day, Committee Three (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) approved the revision of an earlier General Assembly resolution in order to expand the advisory social welfare services of the United Nations. On October 4 and 5, Joint Committee Two and Three meetings were held to organize and to study the report of the Economic and Social Council. Meeting on October 2, under the chairmanship of Prince Wan Waithayakon (Thailand), Committee Four (Trusteeship) elected Ahmed Farrag (Egypt) as vice-chairman and Peter Anker (Norway) as rapporteur and began general debate on the report of the Trusteeship Council. Committee Five (Budgetary and Administrative) also met on October 2, and after unanimously electing Aleksander Krajewski (Poland) vice-chairman, and Bernadus Fourie (South Africa) rapporteur and completing two routine items on its agenda, turned to consideration of the estimates for the 1951 budget of the United Nations. On October 5, Committee Six (Legal) approved a permanent invitation to the Secretary-General of the Arab League to attend the meetings of the General Assembly as an observer.

Security Council

At three meetings held during the week, the Security Council acted favorably on the Ecuadoran proposal concerning Formosa, held that its decision on that resolution was procedural, and rejected the Soviet-sponsored resolution on bombings in Korea.

On September 29, by a vote of 7-3-1, the Security Council adopted the reintroduced Ecuadoran resolution to defer consideration of the complaint of armed invasion of Formosa until the first meeting after November 15 and, at that time, to invite a representative of the Peiping regime to attend Council meetings on this subject. The United States, China, and Cuba cast the 3 negative votes, while Egypt abstained. Following a paragraph-by-paragraph vote and approval of the resolution as a whole with one deletion, Council President Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) commented that in his opinion the resolution was carried.

This action precipitated an involved discussion, which continued into the afternoon, on the applicability of the veto—whether the Ecuadoran resolution involved a procedural or a substantive decision by the Council. Over China's protest, the Security Council voted 9-1 (China), with Cuba abstaining, that the vote to invite a representative of the Peiping regime to attend Council meetings was procedural. Maintaining his right to veto, Dr. Tsiang (China) then declared that the proposition had not carried since he had opposed it. Dr. Tsiang contended that his negative vote constituted a "doubt veto" and cited the statement by

the sponsoring powers at San Francisco in June 1945 that a decision on the preliminary question of whether an issue was procedural or substantive required a majority of seven, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members.

Pointing out that nine Council members had indicated by vote that they considered the action to have been procedural, President Jebb held a grave precedent, not in the general interest of the Security Council, would be created by accepting the substantive interpretation held by only one permanent member. Accordingly, he ruled that, notwithstanding China's objection, the vote taken on the Ecuadoran resolution was procedural. Declaring the President's ruling *ultra vires* and arbitrary, Dr. Tsiang proposed informally that the question be sent to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, which his delegation would agree in advance to accept. President Jebb, interpreting Dr. Tsiang's remarks as a challenge to his ruling, submitted it to a vote of the Council. No one voted, however, and Sir Gladwyn, therefore, declared that the ruling stood. For the record, Dr. Tsiang commented he did not take part in a vote that was in itself "illegal."

Earlier, Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) had stated that it was "quite clear" from the preamble of the Ecuadoran resolution that the invitation to representatives of the Peiping regime would be given under Rule 39 of the Council's Rules of Procedure. The Yugoslav representative, Dr. Ales Bebler, pointed out that the question of inviting parties to a dispute to be heard was one of those specifically enumerated in the San Francisco statement as procedural.

In commenting on China's interpretation that the Ecuadoran proposal involved a matter of substance, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross stated that, although the United States was strongly opposed to the resolution in question, his delegation believed it would be a most undesirable precedent for the Security Council to accept the proposition that an invitation to an outside party to be heard was subject to the veto. The United Nations Charter, the San Francisco declaration, and Council precedents solidly supported that thesis, Ambassador Gross held. Pointing out that the proposed action was being taken under Rule 39, he recalled other cases where the Council had invited and heard representatives over the negative votes of permanent members—the former Czechoslovak representative Papanek and the Chilean representative had been heard during discussion of the Czechoslovak case despite negative votes by the U.S.S.R., and the Indonesian Republic had been invited to Council meetings despite negative votes by the United Kingdom and France. Ambassador Gross also mentioned China's co-sponsorship of the General Assembly resolution which recommended, *inter alia*, that the Security Council regard decisions on rules as well as decisions under Rule 39 as procedural.

In order to explain further the United States position, Ambassador Gross discussed specific provisions of the General Assembly's resolution, the San Francisco statement, and the United States policy in general toward use of the veto. He first, however, reemphasized that his delegation considered the action of the Security Council in deciding to invite Chinese Communist representatives "at this time" neither appropriate nor desirable. In spite of this conviction on the part of the United States delegation, Mr. Gross observed, the position in supporting the procedural interpretation was in accord with the Assembly's recommendation, based on a study by its Interim Committee, that certain decisions, including decisions under Rule 39, be considered procedural by the Security Council. It was United States policy, Ambassador Gross continued, to restrict the use of the veto by extending wherever possible the area of Security Council action to which the veto did not apply. This policy had been determined with the full knowledge that the United States was working to restrict its own veto right, but the opinion of the American delegation was that "in the long run" proper functioning of the United Nations was more important for the permanent members than their power to obstruct action. In this case, the result of applying "the law of the Charter which has developed" was "against our own interest" and was "not pleasant"; however, unless the law were applied in these circumstances, the United States could not expect others to apply it when it was not in their interest. These were the considerations, Ambassador Gross concluded, that had led the United States to take its stand.

Associating himself fully with the United States' position, Sir Gladwyn declared that the expressed willingness of a great power to accept a ruling of the President on a matter concerning the veto was an "augury" of better times.

At a relatively brief meeting on September 30, the Security Council rejected by a vote of 1 (U.S.S.R.)–9–1 (Yugoslavia) the Soviet-proposed resolution on bombings by United States air forces in Korea. Although this resolution was substantially the same as the resolution that had been submitted on August 5 by the Soviet Union and rejected by the Council on September 7 by an identical vote, the Soviet representative claimed to have new "evidence" of "inhuman and barbarous" bombings of civilians. In the course of the discussion, Ambassador Gross cited evidence that civilian dwellings had been used to house tanks and to store military equipment and that soldiers had been disguised as civilians. He again urged the Soviet delegate to appeal to his government to influence the North Korean authorities to permit the entry of an International Red Cross representative.

When the Security Council next meets it will be under the presidency of Ambassador Austin.

THE CONGRESS

Congress Urged Not To Adopt Legislation Controlling Exports of Other Nations to Soviet Union

[Released to the press by the White House September 20]

The President today sent the following letter to Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives:

When the Senate passed H. R. 9526, the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951, it added an amendment, offered by Senator Wherry, which would require the United States to cut off economic and financial assistance to all countries which export to the Soviet Union or its satellites any articles which might be used for the production of military matériel. This amendment is of such grave importance, and is fraught with such danger to the United States and to world peace, that I feel I must make a special request to the Congress to eliminate it in completing action upon this bill.

No one can quarrel with the ostensible purpose of the amendment—to weaken the war-making potential of Communist-dominated countries—and on the surface the amendment may seem to be a plausible means for accomplishing that end. But the fact is that it would defeat its own purpose and accomplish substantially the opposite result from that intended—it would weaken the free nations more than it would weaken the Soviet bloc.

The amendment applies not only to arms and armaments but to any articles that could be used for the production of military matériel. Since almost all goods and commodities can be used for the production of military matériel in one way or another, the amendment, if effective, would require a substantially complete embargo on trade between Western and Eastern Europe. The countries participating in the European Recovery Program have embargoed the export of arms and armaments to Eastern Europe for some two years. But trade in other commodities has continued to some extent. This trade works both ways, of course. Countries of Western Europe obtain from it goods which are vital to their economic and military strength—the very strength we are helping to build up. To cut this trade off suddenly, would bring about dislocations in the Western nations that would more than offset any advantages that might be gained.

The appropriate agencies of the Government have been negotiating, and will continue to negotiate, with countries receiving aid from us in order to curb trade that would aid the war potential of the Soviet bloc, and to do this in a way that

would protect the strength of friendly nations. These negotiations have produced very substantial results and I am confident they will continue to do so. This method, which permits selective and cooperative treatment of the host of varying problems in this field, is far superior to the arbitrary blanket approach prescribed in the amendment now in question.

The amendment affects countries in the Near East and Far East as well as in Europe. Some of these countries do not have strong traditional ties with the Western World. It is important to us to develop and strengthen these ties, which is one of the aims of our assistance programs. While they are friendly to the United States, the trade of those countries with the Soviet Union may be so important to them economically that they would have no alternative but to forego the limited economic aid which we now make available to them. The amendment leaves no room for negotiation, and, accordingly, would tend to force such countries into the Soviet orbit, in spite of their friendship for the United States. The amendment would also have most unfortunate effects on our relations with the Latin American countries. I am sure these are results wanted by nobody who supports the amendment.

Before legislation of this character is adopted, we ought to be sure that we would get more out of it than we would lose. I am convinced that this amendment in its present form would not accomplish the purpose intended but, on the contrary, would do much more harm than good.

Consequently, I earnestly urge the Congress to leave the amendment out of the bill.

I am sending a similar letter to Senator McKellar.

Senate's Concern for Greek Children Praised

The President, on September 29, sent the following letter to Vice President Alben W. Barkley, which was released to the press by the White House on the same date.

I know that all Americans share the Senate's humanitarian concern for the thousands of Greek children removed from Greece during the guerrilla warfare and now being held in eastern Europe. Freedom-loving people throughout the world are repelled by the inhumanity embodied in the unjustified retention of these innocent children far from their parents and their native land.

The Executive Branch has exerted and will continue to exert every feasible effort to encourage the repatriation of these children. I am certain that the United Nations has been encouraged in its efforts to effect the children's return by the Senate's deep and sympathetic concern as expressed in S. Res. 212 on September 13, 1950.

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